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Abstract 
This thesis analyses the work of the international grassroots NGO Trenkalòs, which 
worked in the aftermath of the Bosnian War, from 1997 to the present day. It focuses 
on the unusual strategies they used, developed, and it reflects on the experiences of 
their volunteers. Their largest program was a service learning experience, which 
would immerse volunteers in the reality of the refugee life and the crudeness of an 
ethnic cleansing, as well as provide a historical context accompanied by refugees’ 
stories. 
 
This thesis uses theoretical frameworks such as liberal-hybrid peacebuilding, peace 
education and service learning to analyze the approaches taken by Trenkalòs. The 
data is drawn from interviews with the volunteers, as well as original publications of 
the NGO. The study showcases the evolution of the NGO, and the results of their 
efforts: more than six hundred volunteers trained on development work, Bosnian 
history, culture, and geography.  
 
The experience of the volunteers is positive, fosters solidarity and creates personal 
bonds. Moreover, every activist is an asset both to the NGO and the refugees, as a 
both a psychological and a monetary support. The application of bottom-up peace 
building, everyday efforts and constant visits to the country granted Trenkalòs the 
support of a community and a stable base to develop programs in Bosnia & 
Herzegovina.  
 
Keywords: Bosnia & Herzegovina, Peace & Conflict Research, History, Development, 
Liberal Peacebuilding, Service Learning, Peace Education, NGO, International, 
Trenkalòs, Srebrenica, Refugees, IDP, Volunteering, Grassroots, Ethnic Cleansing, 
Hybrid Peacebuilding. 
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Preface 
The writing of this MA Thesis has been a long process and undergone several 
changes. For someone with a practically-oriented background, it has been an 
intense and challenging journey. What started as a random pick to fulfill the credit 
requirements, gradually became a deep experience that allowed me not only to 
travel to a conflicted country alongside professionals in peacebuilding but also to 
learn about its history, its people and its culture. This country is Bosnia & 
Herzegovina. 
 
As a child born in the early 1990’s, the Bosnian War was the first conflict I was 
taught about in school. Not in class, but rather coincidentally through emergency 
food collection and NGO fundraising. Later, in high school, we had volunteers 
organizing talks about refugees and anti-personnel mines, and the notion that a war 
had happened not so long ago was revived. It is possible that the volunteers who 
visited my high school back in 2004 would have been volunteers from Trenkalòs, the 
very same organization which is analyzed in this paper.  
 
When the moment came to pick a topic, I was sure that some of my colleagues 
would cover currently relevant conflicts like the Syrian civil war, Ukraine, Israel-
Palestine, the Somali refugees in East Africa, Nagorno-Karabakh… so I wished to do 
something different. A forgotten conflict lapidated under the ephemerality of modern 
mass media. During the preliminary research, I became acquainted with a family 
friend that had been in Bosnia three times with an NGO, Trenkalòs, and soon after I 
was enrolled in a trip to the country.  
 
Looking back, I understand that I entered the conflict blindfolded. I was not aware 
that there were still refugees from the war, or of the influence of the international 
community in the country’s decision-making. I was not aware of the extent of the 
activities of that particular NGO. Not only they explained to me what their projects 
were, but I was able to see them. 
 
Still, I thought to have learned about a country, Bosnia & Herzegovina, its people 
and their struggles; about international politics, false promises and imported laws. I 
5 
thought that I was ready to offer solutions to a deep and enmeshed conflict. 
Evidently, I was mistaken. This past summer I participated in Trenkalòs’ Dobro Dosli 
project, lived with the refugees, organized activities with the children, and listened to 
many personal stories of the victims of the war. Every visit strengthens the 
knowledge and cuts deeply in one’s personal views. 
 
It is clear to me that many authors write from the comfort and the distance. 
Constancy, ground knowledge, personal relations with refugees, civilians, and 
political actors, are key to understanding the reality and needs of the people, and 
help them back to their feet, so they can seize the future by themselves. 
 
Albert Borrell 
Summer 2016 
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List of Terms 
Abbreviation Full Name Comments 
DPA Dayton Peace 
Agreement 
 
IDP Internally-Displaced 
People 
 
IDMC Internal 
Displacement 
Monitoring Centre 
 
ICG International Crisis 
Group 
 
SFOR Stabilization Force Multi-national peacekeeping force led by 
NATO. 
 Trenkalòs Catalan-International NGO founded in 1997. 
 Bosniak Bosnian Muslim. 
 Dobro Dosli [Welcome] in Serb-Croat. Also the flagship 
project of Trenkalòs, based on Service- 
Learning. 
 Grassroots NGO A subset of intermediary NGO that supports 
local groups or disadvantaged rural or urban 
households and individuals. 
 Liberal 
Peacebuilding 
Theoretical current that supports the 
implementation of liberal/western systems 
and ideas in conflicted countries as a means 
of reaching peace. 
 Service-Learning Theoretical current that supports an 
exchange between privileged and 
disadvantaged communities in order to 
challenge stereotypes, learn from each other, 
and provide positive outcomes for both. 
 Peace Education Theoretical current that challenges a system 
where education gravitates around conflict in 
order to achieve individual goals, and offers 
tools of communication and tolerance. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Introduction 
This master’s thesis is centered on the analysis of a case study: The Spanish NGO 
Trenkalòs, which performed peacebuilding activities in Bosnia & Herzegovina 
between 1997 and 2012, and has organized activities intermittently between that 
year and 2016. What makes this particular organization special is its volunteer-based, 
grassroots structure and its approach to bottom-up, local-hybrid peacebuilding.  
 
This means that the organization does not have any paid staff; most or all of its 
activities are developed with personnel effort and very limited resources; and they 
focus their efforts in the lower segments of society to make wider changes, instead 
of changing state structures and laws. 
 
This strategy is particularly unusual, especially during the time when liberal 
peacebuilding had become the major strategy used by leading states, international 
organizations and international financial institutions. Liberal peacebuilding argues 
that the defense of democracy, human rights, a rule of law, civil society and liberal 
economics are the most effective (and perhaps the only) way towards the end of 
violent conflicts (Mac Ginty, 2010:393; Richmond & Franks, 2009:56). 
 
Trenkalòs as an organization started with the idea of raising awareness of the 
Bosnian war. After their initial visit, every other trip would be used to transport 
humanitarian material. The situation at the borders and the centers they were 
traveling were critical, and it created an intense learning environment. After eight 
years traveling three or four times to Bosnia & Herzegovina, their volunteer base had 
grown largely enough, and it was matched with a considerable knowledge about the 
country.  
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The needs of the refugees were no longer about food or medicines, but more 
focused on healing the physical and mental wounds of war. At that time, Trenkalòs 
developed their most ambitious project: Dobro Dosli, a service learning program that 
would combine a learning experience for young Catalan volunteers with a 
psychological support for the Bosnian Muslim (from now on referred as Bosniak) 
refugees. 
The aim of this master’s thesis is to study the Grassroots Non-Governmental 
Organization Trenkalòs, to understand the motivations and the focus of volunteers 
behind it. The purpose of this analysis is to determine to what extent this is an 
example of alternative peacebuilding, and consider the possibility to replicate it.  
 
Structure of the Master’s Thesis 
This Master’s Thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter comprises the 
introduction and the structure of the document. The second is focused on setting up 
the premises of the research, such as the research question, the methodology used, 
and certain difficulties and observations that happened across the writing of this 
document. The third chapter describes the historical background, which strongly 
focuses on the Bosnian War, its immediate and long-term consequences, and 
provides data on the return of refugees. 
 
The fourth chapter harnesses the theoretical background used to conduct the 
analysis. This chapter describes mainly three theories: Hybrid-Local Peacebuilding, 
Service Learning and Peace Education. These three combined can be used to 
analyze the unusual strategy of Trenkalòs, and offer an explanation to its efforts and 
continuity in the country. The fifth and sixth chapters are focused in describing the 
work of the NGO and its volunteers, concerning history, personal experiences and 
offering a scope to the scale of their activities. Finally, the seventh contains the 
conclusions, the results of the analysis and the future applications of this work. 
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Chapter 2: Research objective and Research 
Methodology 
Trenkalòs as a case study 
Some considerations 
The data acquired for this master’s thesis concerning the NGO, their activities, 
budget and results are quite scarce. The majority of claims used to elaborate 
arguments come from interviews, materials, and documents produced by the 
organization and its members. As the organization was funded without a proper 
structure, the members did not have a system of archives, so the majority of earlier 
inventory lists, goods transported, investments made, do not exist or are lost. There 
are remains, though: videos, photographs, sparse budget documents; that offer a 
peek at the NGO’s activities, and can be used as pieces of a puzzle, and fill the 
blanks around them.  
 
The principal issue is the authenticity of the facts that the volunteers and organizers 
present, especially because of the possible bias that they can have. To draw as 
much information from the data as possible I rejected the idea to perform a 
comparative analysis, and I decided to take a qualitative approach and look at 
Trenkalòs from the perspective of their actors. Some of the volunteer’s interviews 
were heavily influenced by their personalities, in particular, the co-founder and 
director of Trenkalòs, Jordi Rodrigo. As the most veteran and experienced volunteer 
of the organization, his methods and ideas have been key to shape the structure of 
the NGO.  
 
For a peace builder, his positions are sometimes polarized, especially compared to 
volunteers who joined the organization years later. Other examples, such as Glòria 
Marcet or Bernat Guixer, offer different perspectives, that complete the general 
picture of Trenkalòs. This details can offer insight on the evolution of the NGO, and 
explain particular issues later in the analysis section of this master’s thesis. 
Unfortunately, this leaves the perspective of the refugees on a second term. 
 
10 
Although I was offered the possibility to travel to Bosnia with local guidance and 
translation, I faced two main issues: my lack of funding for the trip, and the 
impossibility to fit both perspectives and describe the NGO in the same Master’s 
Thesis. I acknowledge that the omission of the unprivileged community benefits and 
perspectives is an, unfortunately, common practice in research papers (Jacoby, 
2014:11; Mitchell, 2008:57), but in my limited position I assigned a higher priority to 
the availability of the data.  
 
Finally, as a participant of the 2015 Trenkalòs trip to Bosnia & Herzegovina to 
commemorate the twenty years of the Srebrenica massacre, and the 2016 edition of 
Trenkalòs’ summer camps; I participated in conversations and overheard personal 
information about members of the organization that could explain some of the 
organization’s deficiencies. Since some of this details did not appear in the 
interviews, I will not use that information in the making of this master's’ thesis. I will, 
however, use the data the guides provided during their explanations since they bring 
up several issues that the organization has faced during its existence. 
The case study 
As Jordi Rodrigo describes it, Trenkalòs was created during the boom of the Spanish 
NGO originated by the Bosnian War. The outburst of the conflict triggered the 
creation of huge numbers of humanitarian organizations. The Spanish administration 
regulated these groups under federations and used middleman agencies to prevent 
a flood of human assets in the Bosnian borders (Rodrigo, 2015). 
 
He argues that this situation represented a bureaucratic barrier for immediate 
response, which took time and resources. Trenkalòs, as a small scale organization 
with few assets, had a different approach: to travel by road, without government 
funding. “Instead of organizing field trips for assessing the situation, we had to save 
every penny, so we did it on the go” (Rodrigo, 2015).  
 
This can be taken as Trenkalòs declaration of intent, and provides an interesting 
case study as they pose an alternative to the established rule. It also describes their 
situation: very low funding and a limited reach, but fueled by a strong volunteer basis 
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and personal investment. It would be definitely hard to develop a liberal 
peacebuilding strategy with these limitations.  
 
But all in all, Rodrigo argues that they established a system that worked, conscious 
of its limitations and reaches, but that offered a unique vision to the reality of the 
Bosnians (Rodrigo, 2015). Long-time volunteer Francesc Gassó comments on a 
difference towards bigger organizations: “It was another piece of the reconstruction 
of the country, but one of the few that was there because it believed in what it was 
doing, not because it had to accomplish some deadline” (Gassó, 2016). 
 
The benefits of this approach are many, but they are very hard to calculate. An 
apparently simple and straightforward effort eventually entailed a mass of human 
resources and materials to travel to the country periodically to perform a series of 
activities, amongst them economic development, psychological support and conflict 
awareness. This does not fit a quantitative analysis, with graphs depicting the 
investment of the NGO in the country or their impact on the return of the refugees to 
their previous homes. It entails very personal improvements, that slowly pile up to 
counteract the effects of hate and violence. 
 
I found particularly interesting how an apparently non-academic, untrained group of 
individuals developed a mindset and a method so similar to the theory presented 
above and evolved from a humanitarian aid group to a fully-fledged international 
NGO with a service learning program that moved hundreds of persons every year. 
Therefore, I consider the data acquired sufficient to perform a qualitative research 
project. 
Research Question  
The research question of this Master’s Thesis is focused on the development of the 
NGO Trenkalòs and the experiences of their volunteers. The research question 
reads as follows:   
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What can happen to a humanitarian aid NGO when it commits to a project for two 
decades? How did the NGO volunteers understand the learning process and the 
outcome of their activities? 
 
These two questions are enough to describe the process that the NGO underwent 
during its history, and at the same time take into consideration the agency and 
perspective of its volunteers. These questions are based on the narratives of 
volunteers who experienced first-hand approaches to the day-to-day life of Bosnian 
refugees, some anecdotally, some repeatedly through the years. Since there is a 
considerable lack of records, the witness of these activists can serve as primary 
sources to fill in the gap in one of the most ignored parts of post-conflict development.  
 
The theory presented later in the master’s thesis serves as a framework to better 
understand the NGO’s philosophy. Peace, understanding, learning… either from a 
liberal or illiberal perspective. Was the idea of Liberal Peace or the Responsibility to 
Protect present in the first missions in Bosnia? Perhaps they were present in the 
notions of common understanding, fighting social injustice and the defense of human 
rights.  
 
Maybe there was a hint of Hybrid peace in challenging the bureaucratic barriers of 
the other NGO, more powerful in resources, but slower and sometimes imprecise. In 
blending with the local culture and negotiating with corrupt government officials and 
damaged war veterans and widows. Perhaps in not succeeding in empowering the 
locals to carry on their own economy.  
 
Perchance there was service learning in bringing students to live with refugees, to 
help with reconstruction, learn from the war, and accompany the victims of 
Srebrenica to the annual memorial burial. Perhaps they are not a canonical 
educational institution, with no university credits, but still with a pedagogical method. 
 
In any case, a theory does not describe reality, because the ideal cases it describes 
rarely occur. Nor these examples can be taken as the result of a single input, but the 
combination of several efforts working together towards a joint direction. 
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The question above mentioned can use the combination of these frameworks to 
produce an example of a rather singular peacebuilding action. It can be interesting 
as an example of less orthodox, perhaps hybrid, but still effective peacebuilding. It 
can be useful to anyone who is researching any of the theories cited above, and as 
an example of an alternative to the mainstream liberal peace organizations. Lastly, it 
can be replicated in other areas of Bosnia & Herzegovina, in order to slowly 
counteract the ethnic cleansing. 
Data collection and methodology 
 
The data collected comes in great measure from the organization and the volunteers 
themselves. As primary sources, I used original documents such as official records, 
film footage, photographs, and interviews. Although it can be argued that 
publications such as the book Homage to Srebrenica (Trenkalòs, 2007) and the 
comic book Goodbye, Srebrenica (Trenkalòs, 2005). Since in a certain way they 
analyze the activities of the NGO in the country, I still think of them as primary 
sources, because their non-academic nature and their use of language can be used 
in the analysis as part of their narratives.  
 
As for the interviews, I performed four live interviews through video chat 
communication software; and I am also using pre-recorded interviews used in the 
already mentioned Homage to Srebrenica (2007). I am also using recordings saved 
from explanations offered by the guides in Bosnia & Herzegovina.  
 
The conditions of the interview were agreed in advance, and the subjects were 
provided information about the project, as well as warned that the conversation 
would be recorded in order to be as precise as possible. The interviewees were 
cooperative with one exception, who denied his/her participation. The volunteers are 
(in chronological order): 
 
1. Jordi Rodrigo, co-founder, and director of Trenkalòs. 06-11-2015 
2. Glòria Marcet, an administrative employee of Trenkalòs (2005-2008). 18-02-2016 
3. Bernat Guixer, volunteer, guide, and speaker of Trenkalòs (2005-2009) 19-03-
2016 
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4. Francesc Gassó, volunteer, guide, and IT support of Trenkalòs (2012-2016). 22-
03-2016 
 
All interviewees have spent more than two rounds of service learning in Bosnia & 
Herzegovina. In addition, Marcet has a master’s degree in humanitarian aid and 
another in gender issues, while Gassó has a master’s degree in sustainable 
development. Gassó wrote two travel logs describing his perspective in the camp, 
which are used later on in the analysis part. Jordi Rodrigo wrote in collaboration with 
others the book Homage to Srebrenica (2007), a documentary with the same name, 
and the comic book collection The world in a hole: Books to think (2001-2011), as 
well as other publications that are not used in this master’s thesis because they 
belong to other areas.  
 
The NGO activities are analyzed combining personal impressions from the 
volunteers and comparisons to the theoretical framework to offer a perspective on 
alternative peacebuilding. Although researchers work to find the ultimate peace 
framework to resolve all conflicts, the human factor can alter in a great manner any 
planning, and it hardly follows a general pattern. For that, the method used was the 
qualitative research interview. The interviews were semi-structured, departing from a 
general framework common to all interviewees, but allowing them to develop their 
own opinions and points of view. This is an example of the interviews used: 
 
-How was your first contact with Trenkalòs 
-What was your role in the organization? 
-What kind of training did you receive before going to Bosnia? 
-How many rounds did you travel to the country? 
-Any special memory of Mihatovići and Šahbegovići? 
-What do you think was the impact of Trenkalòs?* 
-What did you think was the impact of the service-learning in the volunteers? 
-What was the reaction of the volunteers once in Catalonia? Do you think they were 
prepared to understand and cope with the situations they encountered in Bosnia? 
 
*Depending on the role of the interviewee, this and other questions were modified or 
added (especially when it came to organizers) 
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As King (2004) argues, the qualitative research interview is best suited “Where a 
study focuses on the meaning of particular phenomena to the participants; where 
individual perceptions of processes within a social unit are to be studied 
prospectively, using a series of interviews; Where individual historical accounts are 
required of how a particular phenomenon developed[...]” (King in Cassel & Symon, 
2004:16-17).  
 
The cases described above match the kind of study I needed, so this method was 
really promising. The usage of semi-structured interviews was interesting because it 
transmitted the idea that the interviewer was already aware of the NGO’s activities, 
so the majority of the interviewees could start directly by offering their views in 
several areas, instead of having had to offer a context. To analyze the data, the 
process used was editing: searching for sections and lines that were useful to 
develop arguments and interpretations (Miller & Crabtree, 1992:3-28). 
 
Both the interviews and the primary sources (publications from the NGO) were 
produced in Catalan and were later translated into English by the author of this 
document so they could be used in the research. 
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Chapter 3: Bosnia, Dayton, and the Refugee 
question 
Introduction 
The second chapter of this master’s thesis is focused on providing a historical 
background, which describes how Bosnia & Herzegovina has dealt with the refugees 
and internally displaced people from the war up to 2013. For the sake of briefness, 
most of the Bosnian war has been summarized into a few dates and anecdotes 
which do not do justice to its fatal consequences, but hopefully, it serves the reader 
as a waypoint towards the later sections of this document. 
The Bosnian War (1992-95) 
Following the secession of Slovenia and Croatia from the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia in 1991, the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was faced with 
a hard decision. To capitulate and be absorbed by Serbia in the guise of the 
Republic of Yugoslavia, or to fight a war which was sure to lose. Croatia had been 
nearly crushed by the superior forces of the Yugoslav Popular Army, under the 
control of the Serb and at the same time Yugoslav president Slobodan Milošević. 
The ceasefire sponsored by the UN in January of 1992 allowed the country to resist 
the Serb advances, but not without losses: the east of Croatia up to the city of 
Vukovar, as well as some areas in the central parts of the country. Grim tales started 
to filter of the atrocities committed by both sides, with deliberate attacks on civilians.  
 
Milošević had the grasp on heavy artillery, tanks, and aviation; but also paramilitary 
groups formed by extreme nationalists, who were brutal in their tactics, being known 
for massacring civilians. The Serbian leader claimed to be the defender of all the 
Serbs, and that included enclaves in all of the former Yugoslav republics. Therefore, 
he had a nationalistic justification to declare war to those who would be “oppressing” 
Serb minorities, although in most of the cases multi-ethnic groups had lived together 
peacefully in the Balkans.  
 
The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina was the most representative, with a mixed 
population of Serbs (32,5%), Croats (17%) and Muslims (Bosniak) (44%), and others 
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(6%). Bosnian Muslim leader, Alija Izetbegovic, organized a referendum for 
independence in February-March of 1992, which resulted in a victory for 
independence by 63,4% of the population. In late March 1992, clashes between 
Bosnian Serbs and combined Bosniak and Croat forces originated the Bosnian War. 
 
As happened in Croatia, the United Nations intervened to prevent more violence. 
After the initial advancement of the Serbian forces, UN high representatives 
designed several plans to concede the Serbian-claimed areas and spare but were 
consecutively rejected by one side or another. Some examples are the Carrington-
Cutileiro (March 1992), Vance-Owen (January 1993), and Owen-Stoltenberg (July 
1993).  
 
The Bosnian crisis became famous for the inability of the UN to stop the violence in 
the country, especially in the safe zones established in Muslim enclaves such as 
Tuzla, Bihać, Srebrenica, Goražde or Zepa. The UN battalions sent to protect the 
Bosniak were overrun, captured, and used as a bargain in international negotiations. 
Airstrikes and embargoes did little to stop the Serbs, who managed to ethnically 
cleanse of Muslims and Croats what had been an intertwined social network before 
the war. This meant to burn, pillage, displace, rape and murder all the non-Serbian 
population, massively and systematically, originating one of the biggest humanitarian 
disasters in Europe since the second world war. 
 
With the fall and subsequent massacre of Srebrenica in July 1995, Russia and 
Serbia, who had been backing the Bosnian Serbs, dropped out their support. NATO 
withdrew their troops and started bombing Serbian positions. On the 21st of 
November, the heads of state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia met in Dayton, Ohio to sign a treaty that would mark the end 
of the war. On the negotiation table, there were democratically elected presidents as 
well as criminals of war. 
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The Dayton Agreement 
The general framework agreement for peace bound the three warring parties; The 
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Republic of 
Yugoslavia to recognize the need to stop the tragic conflict in the region, promote 
peace and stability, ratify their commitment to a series of Basic Principles stated 
further in the document, and noting the agreement which authorized the delegation 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to sign the peace agreement on behalf of the 
Republika Srpska.  
 
The article III of the agreement set apart the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in two: 
The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska; and the article VII 
endorsed the consideration of human rights and the protection of refugees, as well 
as the provision for their return (United Nations, 1995). Although the peace 
agreement states that the parties were to respect each other's’ sovereignty and 
settle disputes by peaceful means, the article IX states that the United Nations 
Security Council is the body who authorized and pursued the fulfillment of the 
annexes, the first indication of the international intervention that would rule in the 
country for years under the banner of Dayton. 
 
David Chandler (1999) describes Dayton as an “Experiment of political engineering”, 
a one-year transitional government led by a High Representative designed by the 
UN, who concentrated the executive and legislative powers, could veto political 
candidates and dismiss non-cooperative elected members of Bosnian governing 
bodies. This situation diminished the role of Bosnians of all ethnic groups in favor of 
international experts, and so did the Republic’s capacity of self-governing.  
 
Chandler questions the assumption that democracy could be imposed on a country 
by international bodies on the basis that its people were lacked the capability of 
governing themselves. To measure how democratic a country is, the European 
Union usually considers the establishment of democratic institutions and holding free 
and fair elections satisfying enough, but if these countries were not “perfect 
democracies”, that is to say, different from traditional western systems, supposed a 
problem for a western ruler (Chandler, 1999; 14).  
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Analyzing the “democracy levels” of a country can be problematic since the results 
can show that there are some higher levels in a country outside the European Union 
than in those inside. In addition, there is a lack of a benchmark for this studies, there 
had not been any test subject on “proper” democracy implementation until that time. 
For theorists, the problem was not the lack of democratic culture, but the idea that 
human rights were deemed irrelevant by the locals. Because of that, the International 
Community changed their priorities, bringing human rights to the table again, and 
promoting them from a domestic policy to a national priority (Chandler, 1999; 21). 
 
One of the particularities of the Bosnian War is the targeting of civilian population, 
especially Bosniak, and their possessions. Records on the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia inform that widespread systematic attacks were 
directed by Serbian forces against any civilian population, with repeated accounts of 
sexual harassment and rape. Civilians would be violently arrested by the military 
police and paramilitaries, often causing the death of the detainees. 
 
Joe Sacco’s Safe Area Gorazde vividly illustrates the chaos and desperation of the 
refugees who fled from the countryside to one of these cities, Gorazde, and the 
horrors that accompanied them during the siege, isolated from the Bosnian Army 
forces. The United Nations intervened and tried to resolve the situation and, in the 
meantime, they started to organize safe corridors (such as the Blue Road) for 
women, children and elderly to flee to Bosnian-controlled areas. Convoys with 
armored vehicles would bring supplies, as well as airdrop caches, but the Bosnian 
Serbs would often intercept these deployments (Sacco, 2000;57-134). 
The fall of Srebrenica 
Srebrenica was of the Bosniak enclaves surrounded after the initial offensive of the 
Bosnian Serbs in 1992. With the aggressive advancement of military troops, 
thousands of refugees slowly poured into the city, soon overflowing its capacity to 
feed and house the newcomers. On March of 1993, the French General Philippe 
Morillon entered the city with supplies, but was held by the locals under the condition 
that the UN would defend them from their attackers. To be able to leave, he told the 
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population that the UN would protect them and open a line of supplies, declaring the 
city a UN “safe area”. 
 
This was not received well in the UN and beyond, as it represented an allegiance 
with the Bosniaks. It was especially alarming for the Bosnian Serb commander in 
charge of the siege of Srebrenica, Ratko Mladić, who demanded the Bosniaks to lay 
down arms in exchange of the creation of the safe area.  
 
As UN representative José Maria Mendiluce argues in the documentary The Death 
of Yugoslavia (1995), “The accord was muslim demilitarization and the establishment 
of a Canadian battalion in exchange of the rendition of Srebrenica, to make it into a 
safe area; which in Serb-Bosnian terms was a big concentration camp surrounded 
and controlled militarily by them” (BBC, 1995: ep. 5). 
 
In 1995, tens of thousands of Muslims had been living for three years under Serb 
siege. It had ceased to be a key asset to the government, and the Serbs were about 
to close in. The attack came on the 6th of July and lasted until the 11th. The 
population started fleeing en masse. They gathered around the UN base in Potočari, 
an industrial area south from the city. On the 11th of July, the few remaining forces 
of the UN Dutchbat were quickly pushed aside by Bosnian Serbs and their 
commander, Ratko Mladić. Twenty-five thousand muslims awaited (BBC, 1995: ep. 
6).   
 
The Serbs issued buses for the Bosniaks, but only women and children arrived to 
their final destination. Waging their options, several thousand men and youths tried 
desperately to reach the nearest Bosniak stronghold, Tuzla, a hundred kilometers 
away. They walked on a straight line for days through mined forests and mountain 
paths. On the trail, Bosnian Serbs awaited them, and used all kinds of weaponry 
against the Bosniaks. Thousands were killed. Those captured would be summarily 
executed and buried in mass graves on the spot or taken away in trucks. Accounts of 
rape and torture are frequent in the trials of the ICTY (ICTY, 2001;171-242). The 
official account of deaths is 8,373 men; according to the Potočari Memorial Center. 
Although Serbs often argue that it did not happen (Biserko & Becirevic, 2009; 2), the 
International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague declared Srebrenica a case of genocide 
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in February 2007(Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide [Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro], 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43). 
Refugee Policies and Progression Throughout the Years 
To ensure that the crimes committed during the war would not be repeated, the effort 
made in Bosnia was especially strong. For that, there was the need to establish a 
culture in which human rights would be universally respected. While the evidence on 
the extent of human rights violations during the war was still being gathered, human 
rights gained a unique focus in the reconstruction of the Bosnian state.  
 
To illustrate this struggle, one can compare to the endeavor in which these rights 
were created to the policies in other countries: in the Dayton Agreement, there are 
16 amendments to protect human rights, compared to 3 in the United States' 
constitution, and 10 in the United Kingdom (Chandler,1999; 22). The implementation 
of these rights is somehow ironical since the forced incorporation of the Dayton 
Agreement raised questions on democratization and popular sovereignty. The status 
of human rights in Bosnia is so high that they are above any political discussion, 
while in other states these rights are limited to what the government determines 
necessary for the wellbeing of the citizens. 
 
After the Cold War and the fall of Yugoslavia, concerns about traditional inter-state 
rivalry shifted to highly militarized world powers and the dangers of fragmentation in 
peripheral states. Nuclear deterrence prevented open international conflicts, so the 
attention turned to “lesser” states, thus nurturing the idea of a moral disparity 
between these and the Western states. This situation allowed the International 
Community to justify the idea of external intervention in order to prevent risks, even 
in countries where there are no open signs of violence.  
 
Bougarel (1996) analyzed why ethnicity became a central political issue through the 
prisoner’s dilemma. The population would choose nationalistic or ethnic parties 
because they identified them as a means to protect themselves and their interests, 
even if it would be a little and short-term gain; instead of voting the parties which 
would be economically or culturally more beneficial for the country’s future. Every 
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ethnic group would suspect of the others, and would bet on their respective radical 
representatives (Bougarel, 1996; 99).  
 
From the point of view of the international community, this analysis would mark the 
candidates as unrepresentative of the electorate’s real interests, and would give the 
idea that the Bosnian War was a direct result of the mismatch between Bosnian 
ethnic culture and liberal democracy, electing the wrong leaders, who in turn would 
use their control over the state institutions to create ‘collective paranoia’ (Woodward, 
1995; 228). The Bosnian political sphere was seen as incapable of resolving conflict 
through rational negotiation and compromise. This situation was deemed in need for 
someone to take control, thus eventually coming with the ‘noble experiment’ of ruling 
the country internationally. 
 
The return of refugees and internally displaced people became a key issue for the 
international community, and the number of returning refugees was used as an 
indicator of democracy and respect for human rights. Still, when some of the 
displaced persons refused to return, the international community immediately 
deemed it a sign of systematic intimidation and manipulation from hardline politicians.  
 
Other options, like starting over in other parts of the country, or the impossibility to 
find work in the refugee’s place of origin were not considered as a plausible decision 
for not returning. Many Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs expressed 
their desire of living somewhere else than their pre-war homes, principally because 
of the shortage of houses and the availability of jobs. By 1996, only 250.000 from 2.1 
million refugees and internally displaced persons had returned to their pre-war 
homes (Chandler, 1999; 105). 
 
The Bosnian economy slowly recovered in the federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
but that was not the case in the Republika Srpska, where the international aid was 
minimal. The economy stagnated in that region, falling far below their pre-war levels, 
and quickly behind the levels of the Federation. This differences not only dissuaded 
the displaced population from returning but also augmented tensions, as the 
returnees were seen as a threat to the local livelihoods.  
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The Bosnian government initially promoted the return of Bosniaks to Bosnian Croat 
and Bosnian Serbian areas in order to spread their support around the country, 
which turned into an angry refusal in the Republika Srpska, because it was seen as 
an imposition of Muslim control. The strong push for return supported by the 
International Community was spoiled by their aggressive interventionism and 
ignorance on the refugees’ opinions, which locals looked at with suspicion.  
 
Again, the outcome of the human rights regulation invigorated by the International 
Community can be questioned, as it stands in the middle ground between the 
legitimate sovereignty of the Bosnian people and the forced implementation of the 
international administrations. Distant from creating a greater sense of security for 
cross-ethnic cooperation, the climate of distrust and the usage of human rights 
abuses as a political tool widened the gap between the Bosnian parties and the 
international community that slowed the process of return and the normal 
coexistence of different ethnic groups (Chandler, 1999; 155). 
 
The failure of Dayton became more and more evident through time. Its purpose, 
further than the cease of hostilities, was to reform a whole state and to reverse the 
effects of the ethnic cleansing. According to a report issued by the International 
Crisis Group in 1999, “Bosnia has three mono-ethnic entities, three armies, three 
police three de facto mono-ethnic entities, three separate armies, three separate 
police forces, and a national government that exists mostly on paper and operates at 
the mercy of the entities” (International Crisis Group, 1999; 3).  
 
Reports of collaboration between the local governments, the police, and extremists 
to prevent the return of refugees were frequent, preventing the creation of a de facto 
multi-ethnic society. The only Dayton successes-the ceasefire, the creation of a 
common currency and a centralized monetary institution, as well as common 
administrative regulations and customs- were minimal, and imposed by the 
international community (ICG, 1999; 2).  
 
Moreover, these little achievements were highly dependent on foreign aid, which was 
starting to mingle. Simultaneously, the withdrawal of funding would provoke a hole in 
the already negative Bosnian GDP, worsened by the skyrocketing numbers of 
24 
unemployment. The frail economic situation fueled discontent and nationalism, with 
frequent demonstrations and road blockades. The policies planned by the 
international community were not implemented by the NATO-led SFOR, due to the 
fear of casualties in their ranks; and the Bosnian Serbs and Croats were waiting for 
the withdrawal of the international support to take over.  
 
Many policies were half implemented, often because the local administration slowed 
the processes, like the regional and sub-regional arms control or the defence of 
human rights; and others were imposed clumsily, as was the country’s constitution or 
the democratic elections, which didn’t correspond to the Bosnian reality, and 
depended highly on foreign support. By 1999, there were 1.2 million displaced 
persons and refugees, waiting for their relocation and posterior return. In the 
Republika Srpska, the return of Bosniaks represented less than a 3% of their original 
population (ICG, 1999; 5).  
 
Perhaps related to this issue is the large numbers of war criminals that hid in the 
Republika Srpska and the Croatian community of “Herzeg-Bosna”. At the time, a 
total number of 66 persons were indicted publicly by The Hague, which only 32 
surrendered or were captured. The rest were scattered through places like Foca, 
Srebrenica, and Prnjavor, preventing the return of refugees from both sides and 
maintaining control over these areas. Ethnic segregation was also present in the 
army: while wearing the same patches, Bosniak and Croat would have different units 
and chains of command (ICG, 1999;7). 
 
The implementation of Human Rights in the Constitution was a pending issue, 
because even though they were officially proclaimed, they could not survive in a 
climate of distrust and ethnic isolation. The balance between the three ethnic groups 
was carefully protected, but only as groups, and within the boundaries of their 
enclaves. Whoever was not Bosniak, Bosnian Serb or Bosnian Croat fell out of the 
equation, and it was also the case with those who actually belonged to these groups, 
but decided to stop doing so.  
 
The mechanism designed to protect a multi-ethnic state turned against the idea of 
civil liberty and equal rights, without any kind of political, religious or cultural 
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discrimination. This was also reflected in the way the power was managed in the 
state. The joint institutions - Presidency, Parliament Assembly and Council of 
Ministers- did not represent the centers of power in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
Instead, the two separate entities would have full control over their own armies, 
police, civil administration and judicial system, and formulate laws as long as they 
didn’t contravene the Bosnian Constitution. Several government officials maintained 
their discrimination towards refugees and returnees, and also did the population. 
Abuses on one group of refugees would often be retaliated in other areas towards 
refugees of opposite ethnic groups, and in general the situation would affect greatly 
to members of minorities with no ties to the biggest nationalistic parties (ICG,1999; 
25). 
 
The key to the implementation of Dayton was the return of refugees to their pre-war 
homes. The annex 7 of the Peace Accord is dedicated to it, although in 1999 it was 
still not implemented. Several external and internal political actors were against the 
return of refugees, hoping to consolidate the control over ethnically cleansed areas. 
According to the 1999 UNHCR report on the failure of Dayton: “As of 31 August 1999, 
only 340,919 refugees have returned to BiH since the signing of the DPA Of these, 
93.3% returned to the Federation, and only 0.7% -- 2,435 people -- were non-Serbs 
returning to Republika Srpska” (ICG,1999; 29).  
 
The report emphasized the misleading nature of the returns, since many of them, up 
to 600.000 only moved back to areas where their ethnic armies would have under 
control. “A further 270,001 displaced persons "returned" to municipalities within 
Bosnia and Herzegovina over the same time period. Of these DPS, 70% either 
returned to or within the Federation. Therefore, since Dayton, a grand total of 
610,920 "returns" have taken place. Given that the war displaced 2.2 million people, 
it would be tempting to claim a 27.8% return figure” (ICG,1999; 29).  
 
The best way to see the whole picture is to look at the numbers of returning 
minorities, who would be less likely to have the means to risk traveling in areas 
where they would be in an ethnic disadvantage. The numbers are about 100,000 
people, a 5% of all the refugees and displaced people that fled during the war. The 
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situation is even worse in the Republika Srpska, whereby 1999, merely 13,500 
Bosniaks and Bosnian-Croatian had returned.  
 
Return numbers between Croat and Bosniak controlled areas clearly give an 
advantage to the Bosniak side, where “35.3% of the 87,128 minority returns have 
been Serbs and Croats returning to Sarajevo Canton. These 30,747 returnees 
represent 30.5% of all minority returns in BiH to date. Throughout BiH, almost two 
out of three minority returns that have taken place since Dayton (64.7%) have been 
to Bosniak-controlled municipalities (65,159 people). In addition, approximately 
25.3% (40,299) of the 158,952 Croat refugees and DPS from Bosniak-controlled 
municipalities have returned since Dayton” (ICG, 1999; 30). 
 
“In contrast, in 1995 only 11.8% (5,317) of the 44,881 Bosniak refugees and 
internally displaced persons had returned to Croat-controlled municipalities in 
Herzegovina. In central Bosnia, the situation was slightly better, as approximately 
16,652 Bosniaks had returned to Croat municipalities. The ratio of Bosniak to Croat 
returns is illuminating. While a total of 22,000 Bosniaks have returned to Croat-
controlled municipalities, 40,000 Croats have returned in the opposite direction. 
Significantly, the Croat returns to Bosniak areas have taken place in spite of intense 
official pressure from the ruling HDZ not to return. The HDZ fears that if Croats 
return to Bosniak areas they will a) free up housing for Bosniaks to return to Croat 
areas, and b) reduce their Croat majorities in those municipalities.” (ICG, 1999; 30). 
 
This data points out that approximately 1,189,150 people including 836,500 internally 
displaced people were still without a permanent housing solution 4 years after the 
ceasefire. The minority return supposed an alert to certain government and military 
actors. While Serb return to Croat areas would not signify a problem, Bosniaks 
returning to the Republika Srpska represented Muslim men ready to fight on Serbian 
soil.  
 
The majority of returnees are old men into rural areas, who didn’t represent a threat, 
and could be used as a beacon for international funding. The problem started when 
Serbs and Herzegovinian Croats signed the DPA without the intention of 
implementing Annex 7. The idea of sharing space with Bosniaks contradicted the 
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war’s main point: to live in an ethnically clean state. For that, the army had a 
particular target: the urban elites, those educated young men who could organize 
their people politically and military. Of these, only a handful have returned to their 
previous properties in the Republika Srpska (ICG, 1999; 33). 
 
In 2005, the United States Congress issued a report on the progress of Dayton for its 
10th anniversary. Although Dayton was still regarded a success in terms of a 
ceasefire, the unstable state structure derived from the agreement could not ensure 
a working democratic state. International pressure was still present on the figure of 
the High Representative, despite the controversial extent of his powers. In the report, 
International Relations and Foreign Affairs Specialist Julie Kim points out that 
several U.S. specialists suggested drastic state-level solutions to tackle the fragile 
Bosnian state structure.  
 
These included “creating a single Presidency instead of the current tripartite 
Presidency; strengthening the Prime Minister’s office; and strengthening the Bosnian 
Parliament” (Kim, 2005:2). The first point is remarkable because it contradicts 
Dayton’s concept of ethnic balance: having a single president would mean that one 
of the three ethnicities would wage a higher influence, and therefore an opportunity 
for the others to argue against it. Interestingly, other solutions such as the elimination 
of the two-entity state or the ban of political groups opposing Dayton had found 
strong opposition with the argument that they attempted against the peace accord’s 
ideas.  
 
It has been suggested before that Bosnian Serbs and Croats were waiting for the 
appropriate moment to gain control over the country, and this situation would have 
been a good starting point. Most certainly, the U.S. officials’ suggestion of abolishing 
the two-entity state aimed towards the facilitation of international operations in the 
Republika Srpska, eternal opponent of Dayton’s policies, and where several top war 
criminals were still suspected of taking shelter in (Kim, 2005:1). 
 
Concerning returnees, a 2004 report from the Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Centre stated that by the time the report was published, about a million of both IDP 
and refugees had returned to their pre-war homes, a number that represented half 
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the displaced people during the war: “As of December 2004, the return figure stands 
at approximately 1,005,000, including 565,000 internally displaced persons. Half of 
those who returned have done so in areas where they are in a minority. These 
minority returns have been among the most difficult challenges faced by the 
international community in its efforts to reverse the ethnic partition of the country. In 
that light, the overall minority return figure can be considered an achievement even 
though the decrease in return movement continued in 2004” (International Displaced 
Monitoring Centre, 2005:9).  
 
The numbers returning to places where they did not belong to a dominant ethnic 
group were slight, although the report states that these particular returns were to the 
areas worst hit by the ethnic cleansing during the war, such as Srebrenica, Bratunac, 
and Zvornik. These people lived in precarious conditions, most of the time in a 
situation of poverty, often without proper housing solutions.  
 
Additionally, the labor market faced strong discrimination problems, based on the 
ethnicity of the applicants, but also on political affiliation, birthplace, and gender. 
However, physical violence became a rarity, although the police and judiciary system 
kept a slow pace. One of the biggest problems of returnees was the existence of 
minefields along the countryside, hindering the development of agriculture and 
livestock breeding. Floods and corruption slowed the process of clearing these 
devices, as well as insufficient funds allocated for this purpose (IDMC, 2004:74). 
 
Oliver Richmond and Jason Franks (2009) described the Bosnian political and 
societal situation as a complete deadlock, preventing any move to solve the 
country’s pressing needs. The barriers raised to protect, but also to separate the 
three ethnic groups now prevent the country from moving forward. The pre-war 
society was intrinsically multi-ethnic at the lowest levels, often among families. The 
breakdown of war not only separated communities, but also family members; forcing 
children to choose allegiances.  
 
The ethnic problem was far deeper than the Dayton’s engineers predicted, and 
formed a temporary peace, but an unfortunate long-term solution. Past the failure of 
the creation of a functioning state, which institutionalized ethnic divisions and 
29 
lingered the recuperation of the country, there was some hope for the enlargement of 
the European Union as a means to bring the liberal democratic ideals into a factual 
reality.  
 
Still, there were several opinions that deemed a constitutional change necessary to 
take that approach, even though it would face a fierce resistance from local powers. 
The Bosnian political sphere was so intrinsically ethnic that the European Union’s 
Venice Commission deemed in 2004 that it partially violated human rights. The 
attempts to change this situation have been constantly delayed or diverted, opposed 
by the local elites (Richmond & Franks, 2009:64). 
 
In 2010, the European Union elaborated a document analyzing the candidacy of 
countries in the West Balkans that had applied for membership. Bosnia-Herzegovina 
was deemed as a problematic candidate due to social, political and economic issues.  
Despite the efforts of international actors, there were several incompatibilities 
between Bosnia’s constitution and the European Convention on human rights.  
 
Some of them are ethnic and religious discrimination against those who belong 
outside the three main ethnic groups; limiting the freedom of expression, assembly, 
and media; failure to prosecute war criminals; and mistreatment of prisoners and 
foreign nationals, among others. 
 
The country needed to be considered able to implement and enforce EU rules for the 
candidacy, or else it would not be accepted “Respect for democratic principles and 
the right to equal treatment without discrimination, as embodied in the ECHR, 
constitutes an essential element of the Interim Agreement.”  (UN, 2010:41).  
 
There was a recognition of the country’s efforts to promote regional reconciliation, 
cooperation and refugee return, but the prevalence of ethnic-oriented issues in legal 
and executive bodies still blocked the process for EU-related reforms and a further 
progression towards an EU membership. The refugee return was still a country-wide 
strategy, although the local integration and the sustainable livelihoods represented a 
concern, and there was a new actor: The Roma population was facing hard living 
conditions and discrimination (United Nations, 2010:49). 
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By December 2013, the remaining number of IDP in Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
still around 103,000. The majority of them lived in private accommodation, but there 
were still some eight thousand living in collective centers. The conditions were 
particularly hard for minorities outside of the three main ethnic groups, such as 
Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian, who live in informal settlements and in particularly dire 
situations.  
 
Addressing these questions, international organizations continued to provide funding 
for regional housing programs, as well as psychological support for victims of the 
conflict. Nevertheless, the return of IDPs has been stalling in the last years, and the 
slow judicial system impairs survivors of wartime violence, especially sexual violence, 
that find themselves as responsible for a household but without the necessary 
resources to maintain it, and became victims of sexual trafficking. Some of the 
obstacles identified by returnees are the lack of jobs, a cross-entity legislation on 
social welfare, the presence of landmines, poor access to health care and destroyed 
housing (IMDC, 2013). 
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Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework 
Introduction 
The third chapter of this master’s thesis focuses on presenting the theoretical 
framework that will be used during the analysis. It is important to clarify that our case 
study, the organization Trenkalòs, started with an unclear or almost inexistent 
theoretical background, later enlarged and improved both by the experience in the 
field, the organizer’s personal research and the addition to personnel with 
experience both in the field and in academia.  
 
Nevertheless, I will argue later that this issue did not undermine the effectiveness of 
their activities, especially due to the volume and the reach of the initial missions, 
which focused on providing the most basic needs of the population. The structure of 
the presented literature is not particularly important, but it reflects a particular point in 
service learning: the balance of outcome between the server and the receiver. All the 
points presented can be interrelated or were used in conjunction with the analysis of 
the organization in both countries. 
 
Having briefly looked at Trenkalòs’ activities, one can argue that their case is 
singular. They claim to have not followed some of the usual practices of mainstream 
NGO active after the Bosnian War, organizing several little-scale, short-lived, but 
continuous self-funded projects; that created a strong connection with local 
communities. This triggered a change in the organization, whose volunteers slowly 
gained a set of skills (logistic, administrative, pedagogical, historical, peace-related, 
among others), which allowed them to aim for bigger projects, without losing their 
grassroots nature. This chapter aims to present the theoretical framework that will be 
used later in the analysis of the case study. 
 
This examples contrast with other NGO, as their projects were bigger and more 
marketable. For example, the creation of volunteer centers, repairing or creating new 
infrastructures, or providing mass amounts of aid were commonplace. The difference 
here lays in how these resources were used, and for how long. A great investment 
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can result in new and modern-looking schools or hospitals, but if there are no 
children to attend the school, or the state cannot afford to maintain the hospitals, 
these investments go to waste.  
 
In a similar way, distributing aid uniformly can seem very positive; but in a post-war 
scenario, focusing efforts towards those who are capable of rebuilding and leading 
communities might be more profitable in a long term than to spread the efforts in one 
or two waves, which is more expensive and can be perceived only as tokens to buy 
sympathies.  
 
The following sections will be presenting different theoretical frameworks to frame 
our case study. These are Local-Hybrid Peacebuilding, Service Learning, and Peace 
Education. The state building project organized by the international community was 
keen on importing western models of security, justice, and law to the Balkan country. 
To fulfill these ideals, the UN representatives focused in high educated elites, such 
as teachers, lawyers, journalists, intellectuals, and academics; to develop top-down 
community-building initiatives (Chandler, 1999; 140).  
 
This created a situation where urbanites with international standards would design 
programs for rural areas, sometimes ignoring the large differences between the two 
(Rodrigo, 2015). This, added to the presence of corruption and the lack of 
collaboration between the central government and officials in the Republika Srpska, 
limited in a great manner the application of community-building projects, or the 
maintenance of those developed prior by international NGOs. 
An overview of the theoretical ideas of the NGO Trenkalòs 
The ideas of a bottom-up peace, based on listening to the needs of the local 
communities and providing them tools of agency, arrived with the first missions of 
Trenkalòs. Although the NGO’s agenda was not based on a strong academic 
background, they used concepts that are part of hybrid peace, peace formation and 
popular peace to achieve some of their peacebuilding activities. The example of 
service learning is strongly present after the transformation of Trenkalòs in 2005, due 
to the change in the needs of the population.  
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As a service learning agency, the NGO would recruit volunteers from middle-high 
class backgrounds in Catalonia to travel to Bosnia as working force and 
psychological support. This concept circles around an exchange between the server 
and the served. The youngsters would learn about the country, its history, its war, 
the peacebuilding process, and its effects on the people. The idea was that a 
firsthand experience would shake the foundations of the comfortable, perhaps naïve 
world of the volunteers, to show an alternative reality where whole generations were 
left in stasis, without a future.  
 
The third and last practice is peace education, which focuses on changing the 
mentality of violence-based societies to peaceful ones. Although it is perhaps harder 
to attribute Trenkalòs an educational campaign in Bosnia, their work in Catalonia is 
no doubt impressive. As one of the few organizations that were consistent in visiting 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and capturing the realities of the population, they had firsthand 
anecdotes and stories to effectively engage with the public.  
 
These three theories are strongly interrelated, and perhaps as a trifecta, they would 
not be suitable for many peace-needing situations, but here they align to create a 
singular synergistic situation. Perhaps these concepts can be subjected to critic, 
since some of the flaws of liberal peace transcend in service-learning and peace 
education, such as the predominance of paternalistic ideals, the idea that the 
western structures are the only peaceful ones, and therefore non-western individuals 
are conflict-prone, and the negative peace outcomes intervened countries usually 
reach. Besides, theories are always subjected to the imperfection of the human hand, 
the inability to break stalemates, reach positive zero sum agreements, and overcome 
the weariness of prolonged effort in conflict-struck countries. 
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Liberal Peacebuilding 
What is Local-Hybrid Peacebuilding 
Brought up as a critic of liberal peacebuilding, the fourth generation of peace 
practitioners call for a local, flexible bottom-up approaches to peace and state 
building (Chandler, 2010; Mac Ginty, 2010; Belloni, 2010, Roberts, 2011; 
Richmond,2013). The term was first brought up as hybrid peace, due to its nature of 
combining international/liberal and local/western actors, methods and efforts to 
achieve positive peace (Richmond, 2001:331). Hybrid peace is described by Robert 
Belloni (2010) as a situation where “liberal and illiberal norms, institutions and actors 
coexist” (Belloni, 2010:22).  
 
Oliver Richmond (2015) develops this explanation by adding a geopolitical prism: 
“(Hybrid Peace) represent an intersubjective mediation between local and 
international scales and norms, institutions, law, right, needs and interests[...] they 
develop through a tense process of hybrid politics, whereby various local factions 
and international norms and interests remain opposed in a hybrid negative peace 
arrangement, until an accommodation is reached that advances both local and 
international legitimacy” (Richmond, 2015:51).  
 
This is the case in the majority of conflicts where international institutions intervene. 
Richmond recognizes the capacity of negative peace to take international structures 
into national frameworks but observes that the real intent is to achieve positive 
hybrid peace, which challenges social injustice and local legitimacy. This allows him 
to criticize the elitist views of neoliberalism, while hybrid peace considers the 
universal capacity of every citizen to make a real change in society (Richmond, 
2015:51). 
 
Several authors attribute the creation of this line of thought as a reaction from 
observing the flaws of liberal peacebuilding, especially regarding its westernizing and 
paternalistic attitude (Richmond, 2001:331; Mac Ginty, 2010:392; Belloni, 2012:23). 
Roger Mac Ginty especially mentions that when liberal peace practitioners introduce 
policies in intervened countries, they can enter into conflict with traditional or already 
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established local dynamics, creating an incompatibility and generating rejection (Mac 
Ginty, 2010:393).  
 
One example of this situation is the pre-war multi-ethnic Bosnia, in which 
multiculturality was deeply enmeshed in society. The ethnic cleansing first destroyed 
this balance, but the international community, believing that Bosnians of all ethnic 
groups were incapable of reaching peaceful resolutions, separated them in different 
regions. This prevented violence. but at the same time averted any positive contact 
among them, and highly hindered refugee return (Richmond and Franks, 2015:69). 
 
Belloni argues that Western influences over local political and social forces are 
difficult to separate. He means that with globalization, the original or indigenous 
positions have gradually become hybridized, stopping to be fully homogenous. It is 
also the case of countries affected by international intervention, which has already 
become part of the global political and economic map (Belloni, 2010:23). Mac Ginty 
asserts that a common belief among western governments and international 
organizations is that “liberalism is intrinsically peace-promoting”.  
 
Since liberal states do not wage war with each other, thus is quickly assumed that 
applying liberalism to warring states will cease any future hostilities. This premise 
allows individuals and states to believe in the superiority of their system compared to 
others and displaces the perception of citizens in warring countries from neutral 
bodies to victims or less developed individuals (Mac Ginty, 2010:394). 
 
Mac Ginty and Belloni both point out the central irony of liberal peacebuilding: “the 
usage of illiberal means in the promotion of liberal values” (Mac Ginty, 2010:395; 
Belloni, 2010:23), equating liberal peace to negative peace, considering sufficient 
any cease of hostilities without the need of a deep structural change. Richmond & 
Franks exemplify this situation as the paradox where the international institutions 
pretend to reach a liberal agenda while seizing the control of the peacebuilding 
process (Richmond & Franks, 2015:57).  
 
Mac Ginty and Belloni also criticize the uneven share of the incentives of this 
practice, which often clashes with the different layers in society. Power usually 
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resides in leaders and oligarchs, while common citizens see very few benefits. An 
example is the United Nations’ High Representative in Bosnia, who has been 
criticized for holding a quasi-colonial rule over the country.  
 
Mac Ginty then targets the promotion of western values and the free market, 
protecting the private sector in detriment of the common good; hence criticizing the 
assumption that replicating western-style governments in post-conflict countries will 
overcome any past grievances, falling into the trap of creating a generic state 
sustained on theoretical solutions, that often diverge from the real needs of the 
population (Mac Ginty, 2010:395).  
 
In a previous article, Richmond argues that while liberal conflict-ending processes 
are presented positively, what they seek is to preserve the international order, a 
strategy that assesses aggressive implementation and expires once the external 
powers withdraw (Richmond, 2001:336). It also creates a situation of dependency: 
liberal peace is ideally a tool to help citizens rebuild a state with a democratic system 
and a set of laws derived from western models.  
 
But if the appointed government does not reach agreements that help these ideals 
prosper; there are sectors of society that resist their implementation; or in essence, 
there is the future possibility of conflict relapse, intervenors are forced to stay 
(especially for their international reputation) to maintain the status quo, thus reaching 
the stalemate of negative peace. 
Hybridity 
Mac Ginty describes hybridity as altering the idea of state homogeneity. Presenting it 
this way offers the possibility to look at a society as a diluted entity, with no national 
and cultural anxieties. Instead of hybrid in a sense of weakness or adulteration, the 
idea is to have a multicultural society that lends and borrows within itself.  
 
The author hence describes society as a fluid entity that continuously evolves, even 
in isolated cases. Avoiding the idea of pure societies allows us to move away from 
binary descriptions (us/them, good/evil), which are over simplistic and may project 
misguided ideas of other human beings.  
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Understanding society as this hybrid and dynamic entity offers a different perspective 
of social and political actors and groups, with disregard on their scale and social 
stratum (Mac Ginty, 2010:397). Since no one is “pure”, the idea of western/liberal 
peace as the only peace-generating social structure loses weight, and new ideas can 
come into consideration. 
 
The ability to reach a hybrid peace is limited by many variables, from every different 
actor involved in the peace process. One of these is the capacity of the host society 
to resist, ignore, subvert or adapt liberal peace interventions. This power to resist is 
highly important when considering the agency of local actors in peacebuilding, 
especially when they depart from already existing and effective structures and norms.  
 
Besides, resisting the international effort of transformation towards the liberal model 
can be difficult to resist, since these powers are often unrivaled both politically, 
economically and militarily. Mac Ginty’s last argument is the difficult task of 
recognizing and approaching with the many parts that would form a hybrid peace 
“multiple actors interacting on multiple issues, with no guarantee of consistency on 
the part of actors, actions, and reactions”. He concludes that hybrid peace is a 
dynamic model, with different factors “interacting to constrain and distort the 
activities of the others” (Mac Ginty, 2010:408).  
 
Belloni argues that “three major forms of hybrid peace governance can be identified 
along the liberal-illiberal peace axis”; with governments investing in local traditional 
forms of governance, such as chiefdoms and kingdoms; non-state organizations, e.g. 
elder councils formally integrated in state structures; and liberal institutions being 
ruled by violent non-state actors or organizations, that act for their own benefit in 
detriment of the whole society (Belloni, 2010:26). Interestingly enough, most of the 
situations mentioned above accomplish negative peace, similarly to the majority of 
liberal state building attempts. This situation calls for a revision of the critic, the limits 
of hybrid peace. 
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Alternative approaches of hybrid peacebuilding  
What is Peace Formation? 
Critics of the nomenclature of hybrid peace processes have argued that in practice, 
every peacebuilding effort is hybrid (Laffey & Nadarajah, 2012:404). Therefore, 
Oliver Richmond offers an alternative name: peace formation, “where indigenous or 
local agents of peacebuilding, conflict resolution or development, in customary, 
religious, cultural, social, local political or local government settings, find ways of 
establishing peace processes and dynamic local forms of peace, which are also 
constitutive of their state” (Richmond, 2013:383).  
 
Richmond argues that these processes are conducted by subalterns, a postcolonial 
term that refers to the population outside of the hegemonic power structures. These 
actors focus on the prevention of violence by non-violent means, and the 
modernization of local identities and political institutions. They often reach out for 
international bodies and actors, as they see political figures as influential game 
changers (Richmond, 2013:380).  
 
Several authors discuss that every day, individual efforts are key to reach peace, 
since they deal with the needs of the population, the most important actors for a 
successful peace (Richmond & Mitchell, 2011:2; Roberts, 2011:2538). Richmond 
establishes that peace formation tries to understand the local formation of peace, 
subtle peace practices that the society creates to react to the conflict it experiences 
(Richmond, 2013:384).  
 
The author highlights the importance of peace formation in the sense that is a 
localized process that transcends regions and borders to reach international bodies, 
creating local agency in the peace process. This implies the creation of a local, 
disembodied stakeholder that can influence concepts of liberal peace, enhance 
democratic participation and international organizations.  
 
Understanding local actors as power holders originates a debate towards the unitary, 
hierarchical nature of international relationships, and the possibility of a non-liberal 
actor to affect said structures (Richmond, 2013:392). The author exemplifies this by 
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describing ‘patchwork’ structures, social networks in the Balkans where individuals 
aid each other in matters of care, jobs, health or identity among others.  
 
As Belloni points out, “examples of specific war-torn states like Iraq, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and the Democratic Republic of Congo confirm, different national 
sectors frequently hold a wide range of interests and affiliations (Belloni, 2010:28). 
Although these systems may have been affected or completely destroyed by the 
conflict, forms of kinship or common understanding may remain. However, 
Richmond argues that these processes need international and state support, 
converging local and international legitimacy, thus forming a self-feeding cycle 
(Richmond, 2013:393). 
What is Popular Peace? 
David Roberts (2011) describes local peace practices where unprivileged actors are 
recognized, and discourses and practices of hierarchical domination are removed in 
an absolute fashion. This way, locals are empowered and the decisions and choices 
they make “render ownership, participation and stake holding relevant to them and 
meaningful” (Roberts, 2011:2538).  
 
This is the foundation of the concept of emancipatory or popular peace, a tool of 
liberation from established generic models designed and imposed from external 
sources. Here the author revisits the already mentioned concept of the everyday, the 
way in which people react and resist their environments and manage the gaps 
between external constraints and personal aspirations (Roberts, 2011:2541). To 
provide this liberation, popular peace observes and highlights the everyday needs of 
the local population, which are then enabled by international actors with concurring 
interests in creating a stable peace.  
 
Roberts elaborates this argument with examples, like the case of a local community 
in Cambodia that had the resources for water filters available but lacked the 
technology, which was later provided by a UN peace corps (Roberts, 2011:2549). 
The author further arguments that the knowledge can be easily found in NGOs and 
INGOs, which can provide either supplies or technology to the local communities if 
they are aware of their needs.  
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He rejects the idea of imposing the technology, rather softly introducing concepts, 
like the relationship between waterborne microbes and related illnesses, and then let 
the community decide to take the external aid or not (Roberts, 2011:2551). The 
placeholder of the agency here is very important for the future implications and 
decisions the community will take on their own, especially since it avoids a 
relationship of dependence between the organization and the community.  
 
A flawed concept? Negative or Positive Hybrid Peacebuilding? 
 
Hybrid peacebuilding is not flawless. In fact, the combination of different models, 
fluent but slow by nature, can be volatile when forced down. Belloni (2010) considers 
the static nature of conservative and traditional systems, that aim for self-
preservation. This could mean that if society is experiencing a change but the state 
structures do not, violence can erupt in order to repress it. The events occurred 
during the Arab Spring between 2010 and 2012 are examples of that.  
 
Another example is that of states suffering from traditional widespread corruption, 
where political support can be bought. The application of hybrid peace models can 
alter the political status quo, and turn into top-down state repression 
(Belloni,2010:33). Roberts arguments that there are two principal issues with local-
hybrid peacebuilding: The vulnerability of the process to local corruption and the 
extent to which international donors will cede control over the process, especially 
when they are bound to be held accountable at home. (Roberts, 2013:2553).  
 
Richmond (2015) looks at hybrid peace criticism with a list of dilemmas that are 
inherent in this doctrine. Questions like the primacy of needs over rights, local 
legitimacy over state laws, agency of peace in local or international actors, or the 
societal level international peacemakers have to help first; provoke a steady need for 
dialogue and negotiation between the different actors.  
 
As he argues, peace negotiations can easily lean towards negative hybrid peace, or 
hybrid politics, since the international actors’ preferences dictate the demands. To 
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reach a positive hybrid peace it would be needed to identify the everyday needs and 
realities of the population.  
This way, Richmond criticizes calling any form of oppressive policy or organization 
as a hybrid form of peace, since these are far from empathetic and emancipatory. 
“These situations represent hybrid politics leading to, at best, a negative hybrid 
peace, where elite or certain groups interests are maintained, even if mitigated by 
wider societal interests” (Richmond, 2015:63).  
To reach a positive form of hybrid peace it may be required to legitimize the peace 
process together among local, regional and international actors. To achieve this 
state there has to be a steady equilibrium of power between the three, and these are 
incompatible with nationalism, radical social stratification and neo-colonial mindsets 
(Richmond, 2015:64). 
Service Learning 
What is service learning? 
A simple definition of service learning would be a volunteer-based activity that aims 
to help a disadvantaged community in order to create a reciprocal advantage. 
Several authors either expand or narrow this definition, based on John Dewey’s 
experiential learning theory. For example, in Thomas Ehrlich (1996) focuses on the 
link between academic study and community service, and how they reinforce each 
other by the use of experiential rather than theoretical knowledge. He also mentions 
problem resolution as a step towards the application of complex ideas, which derives 
in the capacity of resolving even more complex problems (Ehrlich,1996:2).  
 
Bringle and Hatcher (1995) emphasize the role of experiential learning on university 
students, as a tool of reflection and civic duty (Bringle and Hatcher, 1995:1). Perhaps 
Furco’s explanation and consequent model are the most suitable for a common 
definition of this practice: “Service-learning seeks to engage individuals in activities 
that combine both community service and academic learning. Because service-
learning programs are typically rooted in formal courses (core academic, elective, or 
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vocational), the service activities are usually based on particular curricular concepts 
that are being taught.” (Furco, 2002:25). 
 
The lack of a consensus on the definition across several United States’ universities 
and countries that adopted this practice since the beginning of the 1980’s provoked 
some confusion and misinterpretation of the terms service learning, community 
service, civic engagement, and similar practices that involved volunteering and 
apprenticeship (Furco, 1996:2-6). To offer a temporary solution, Robert Sigmon 
(1994) designed a model that would facilitate the keys to a proper definition (Fig.1). 
The purpose of his model was not only helpful in providing criteria to differentiate 
service learning from other types of altruistic activities, but also in providing a basis 
for clarifying distinctions among different types of service-oriented experiential 
education programs (Furco, 1996, 3). 
Fig. 1 
 
Based on Sigmon’s concretions, Andrew Furco designed a visual model (Fig. 2) that 
would further help distinguish service-learning from other forms of voluntary work in 
academia, such as community service or an internship, as well as indicate the 
receiver of the outcome and the purpose of the activity. Furco distributes each 
activity in a certain range of points on the continuum, outlining the idea that even 
being close to another, every program has its unique characteristics. “It is that ability 
to distinguish among these service program types that allows us to move closer 
toward a universal definition of service-learning” (Furco, 1996:3). 
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Furco reflects on the incomplete nature of his model, besides bringing assistance to 
a more precise definition of service learning. The areas where different activities 
collide might be a source for future misinterpretation, but the author argues that 
experiential education is fluid and that every altruistic program can slide along the 
continuum. The author concludes that the key to distinguishing a service-learning 
program from other experiential programs is to identify what is its focus, and who is 
benefitting from it (Furco, 1996:4). 
 
 
Fig.2 
Source: Furco, 1996, p.3. 
 
Furco’s model has been used by several scholars as well as Sigmund’s to elaborate 
on the nature of service learning and its differentiation from other activities. For 
example, although community service is close to service learning, since it inherently 
provides a service in exchange of a better understanding of a community problem, 
Barbara Jacoby (2014) distinguishes it as it does not necessary include reflection 
and may lack academic credibility, as well as the term being tainted for being related 
to a court sentence.  
 
The author defines service learning as explicitly “designed to promote learning about 
the historical, sociological, cultural, economic and political context that underlie the 
needs or issues the students address” (Jacoby, 2014:3). She recognizes reciprocity 
as an intrinsic part of service learning, viewing the institution and the community as 
both assets and needs.  
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This implies that when designing a project, it should be planned with the community, 
and addressing the needs the community identifies (Jacoby, 2014:6). Jacoby also 
reflects on the usage of the word service, since it fails to address this sense of 
reciprocity, it essentially involves an asymmetric effort by one of the parts involved in 
service learning. Moreover, for some communities that have undergone forms of 
abuse and oppression, service still entails forced servitude (Jacoby, 2014:10). 
Benefits of service learning 
Barbara Jacoby (2014) quotes George Kuh’s (2008) description of the benefits of 
Service Learning, as a beneficial, high-impact educational practice. This kind of 
program is particularly efficient in motivating participants, who invest time and effort 
in order to engage with people from very different backgrounds, experience 
challenging learning inputs, interact with faculty and fellow students and discover the 
importance of their studies in a real world scenario (Jacoby, 2014:11).  
 
The author offers her perspective on service learning benefits: “Students who 
participate in high-quality service-learning have the opportunity to see and act on the 
problems individuals and communities face, engage in dialogue and problem-solving 
with the people most affected, and observe firsthand the effects of racism, sexism, 
poverty, and oppression.” (Jacoby, 2014:11)  
 
Jacoby also examines students’ reflections on their field experiences, as a key part 
of service learning. The attitudinal shift (or the lack of it), provoked by their 
participation is highly important to understand and analyze the usefulness of this 
practice. The author dubs this process as flourishing, a development towards a 
social and psychological well-being.  
 
This realization of the practical uses of the theory learned in class result in a 
personal growth and a better understanding of the complexity of the social fabric, 
easing the path of becoming less a part of the problem and more a part of the 
solution. It frequently encourages the practice of volunteering, and increases 
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understanding of different cultures and racial issues, promoting open-mindedness 
(Jacoby, 2014:11). 
 
Sara Grusky offers a more educational-focused approach to students’ benefits, such 
as the ties between the classroom abstract subjects [“theories of economic and 
political development, concepts of citizenship, political participation and participatory 
democracy, trade liberalization policies, sustainable development models, grassroots 
social movement organizations…” (Grusky, 2000:856)] into real life concerns. She 
adds that the possibility of living in a distinct political structure, with local families and 
their realities, is an invaluable experience to understand these concepts and stem 
profound questions.  
 
Even in a situation where a student only gain would be to be exposed to societal 
realities that might be invisible in his or her daily life, the author sees an opportunity 
to overcome arrogance and pose fundamental questions on the nature of service 
learning, and to improve partnerships between agency and community. This inquiry 
might cause a chain effect to students, providing a precedent to question deeply-
rooted assumptions of western societal dynamics, like the effect of high standards of 
life in powerful countries towards disadvantaged countries.  
 
“The question “Why are so many people in this situation?” needs to be answered. 
Student attitudes that simplistically blame individuals for their poverty need to be 
addressed. Connections should be made between government policies (that may 
have been conditioned for receiving IMF or World bank loans) and the impact of 
these policies on peasants or workers struggling to make a living. Much less analysis 
has been done on the impact on the collaborating communities, programs, and 
agencies” (Grusky, 2000, 860). 
Critiques of service learning 
As it has already been stated, service learning is often a flawed practice. The 
balance between service and learning is sometimes broken in favor of one group or 
the other, and cultural mannerisms, paternalism or ignorance can produce fairly 
negative outcomes for all participants.  
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As Grusky states it: “Without thoughtful preparation, orientation, program 
development and the encouragement of study, and critical analysis and reflection, 
the programs can easily become small theaters that recreate historic cultural 
misunderstandings and simplistic stereotypes and replay, on a more intimate scale, 
the huge disparities in income and opportunity that characterize North-South 
relations today” (Grusky, 2000:858). A usual critique on the supposed benefits of 
service learning on volunteers is that the results are measured through student self-
reflection reports, instead of using an independent method for each specific class 
(Giles & Eyler, 1998:67).  
 
This method may even differ from one institution to another, which could provide 
misleading results. One of the flaws of service learning is the tendency to prioritize 
the needs of the students before those of the community members. It is also the 
case when it comes to the research of the benefits of this practice since there is a 
scarcity of research on the benefits in the community, especially compared to the 
amount dedicated to the students.  
 
The positive outcomes are often focused on material achievements, such as 
imported technology, advancement towards the organization’s goals, post-conflict 
reconstruction, monetary investments; but also new problem-solving methods and 
networking with and among affected communities (Jacoby, 2014:11; Mitchell, 
2008:57).  
 
Giles and Eyler (1996) argue that there is an increment on the data recollection from 
service learning projects concerning the services are given to the community, but 
there is little evidence of the involvement of the community in these enterprises, or 
enough effort in stimulating students’ self-reflection (Giles & Eyler, 1998:68) Other 
examples, such as the exploitation of disadvantaged communities as a free source 
of student education, the perpetuation of stereotypes derived from a paternalistic 
perception towards charity and disadvantaged communities, and the disconnection 
between classroom and field work; enlighten the need for a new approach towards 
service learning.  
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Other questions, such as the impact of service learning at the community level, 
challenges on the implementation of the programs, and examples of the implication 
of local actors in service learning programs, still require further research (Stoecker & 
Tryon, 2009:4). Mitchell (2008) argues that involving students in activities that 
actually involve social change implies that teachers and practitioners might need to 
step out of the traditional benefic and community-based organizations, to work in 
collaboration with active political entities that fight against social injustice.  
 
This point is particularly sensitive since there is a risk to fall into indoctrination 
(Mitchell, 2008:54-56). The author also indicates the importance of the relationship 
between the students and the community, and how this can be somehow polarized: 
sometimes there is an emphasis on the differences between the two, and in some 
other times, the agency tries to force similarities between the two groups to quickly 
cultivate a relationship.  
 
Mitchell argues that the students must be aware of these two, and reflect on how 
they affect their relationship towards the community (Mitchell, 2008:59). This is 
especially important when considering the extent of their influence in the community, 
a power they hold, sometimes unknowingly, as representatives of more privileged 
strata of society. Being able to reach this balance has a lot to do with the long-time 
effects of the service-learning activities.  
 
As Mitchell argues, combating social injustice is not something that is resolved in 
one semester. Continuity is key to maintain a relationship, and proof that there is an 
authentic effort from academia to the community. This authenticity is established by 
reaching an equal level of dialogue, avoiding arrogant or pandering attitudes, and 
establishing a line of work where students are periodically engaged and involved in 
the work of the service agency. Therefore, long-term cooperation between service 
institutions and communities should be the goal for critical service learning (Mitchell, 
2008:60). 
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Peace Education 
What is Peace Education? 
Ian Harris (2004) describes peace education as a way to study violence “in all its 
manifestations and educating to counteract the war system for the creation of a 
peace system- a peace system on both the structural and international level” (Harris, 
2004:5).  
 
Harris suggests that instead of reinforcing the hegemonic structure of historical and 
social problems, solved by war and dispute, all manners of professionals that deal 
with the education of the new generations should focus on pointing out the problems 
of violence, and offer their pupils strategies for peace. Hossain B. Danesh (2006) 
also criticizes this issue: “Current education revolves around conflict, violence, and 
war, through example of ethnic and national heroes and leaders and through mass 
media[...] However, issues of coexistence, interdependence, and cooperation- 
factors that are the core of both formation and maintenance of life- are often given 
less attention and credence.” (Danesh, 2006:57) 
 
Addressing the issues of conflict and offering peaceful solutions to these problems is 
presented by the author as an empowering tool to redress violent situations. In 
school’s environments, these ideas reinforce the sense of belonging to a bigger 
social group and strengthen human relations.  
 
Harris describes different theories of peace education, although all have a 
resemblance or are interrelated: “International education, human rights education, 
development education, environmental education and conflict resolution 
education[...]They have in common the attempt to explain different forms of violence 
and provide information about alternatives to violence” (Harris, 2004:6). 
 
Peace education explains what peace is, why is absent and how to attain it. It also 
provides a skill set on non-violent conflict resolutions and peaceful attitudes. It offers 
both a practical and a conceptual challenge, e.g. the student’s relation towards him 
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or herself and others, but also towards the environment: social structures, nature, 
family, both local and internationally.  
 
This distinct dimensions, or spheres, are important towards the scale of the activities 
and its classification: it’s different to deal with a mono-ethnic community with an 
economical source of violence than a multi-ethnic, interfaith conflict. The standards 
of peace will be different depending on which kind of society the conflict is located in 
(Harris, 2004:7).  
 
This is particularly unattractive to those who challenge social injustice, who prefer 
the label conflict resolution but repel the idea of an all-peaceful society. Peace has 
other controversial connotations, such as negative peace, without any further 
improvement in social improvement; or the linkage to religious ideas that might not 
be as attractive to secular practitioners (Harris, 2004:8).  
 
International education cherishes education as the only way to achieve peace, 
therefore seeking for understanding and common values to reach peaceful 
agreements. This branch of peace education relies on the study of different cultures 
and the development of a tolerant society which is less conflict prone. It aims to 
create a sense of belonging to a global society and improve the empathic skills of the 
pupils (Harris, 2004:10).  
 
Human rights education seeks to protect the basic rights of all people, eliminating the 
differences created by society and thus eliminating stereotypes and opening 
dialogue between different groups. Exclusion and discrimination are topics especially 
tackled, and identity is a key factor since it is identified as the reason for conflict. 
Practitioners of this branch are especially focused on replacing the enemy images to 
promote mutual understanding and deal with atrocities committed in intractable 
conflicts (Harris, 2004:11). 
 
Development education is based on based on Johan Galtung’s works. The 
distinction between positive and negative peace is key to understand this extension 
of peace education since it focuses on the benefits of positive peace as a future 
conflict prevention. As Harris points out: “Positive peace requires both the adoption 
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of a set of beliefs by individuals and the presence of social institutions that provide 
for an equitable distribution of resources and peaceful resolution of conflicts. Galtung 
also pointed out how structural violence, the inequitable denial of resources, causes 
violence” (Harris, 2004:11).  
 
The rush of modernity promoted by corporate elites creates different forms of 
structural violence, that need to be identified and studied, to produce societal bodies 
able to cope with them. This process needs the implication of common people, 
usually the ones most affected by this sort of violence, and therefore the most suited 
to attain this task. Developmental education is controversial because it improves and 
grows with the presence of social injustice.  
 
Environmental peace education is based on the connection between society and its 
natural habitat, how they interact, affect and depend on each other. It is the task of 
its promoters to increase awareness of these issues and provide strategies to 
cushion the noxious effects originated by poor waste management, pollution, abuse 
of fossil resources or deforestation.  
 
Finally, conflict resolution focuses on the causes of violence, especially among 
children, by exposing the benefits of cooperation and open-mindedness, and counter 
hostile behaviors learned in the broader culture. Prevention of violence and 
encouragement of dialogue to resolve disputes are skills often found in this branch, 
especially on youth consumers of mass media with violent content, who might not 
know how to process it (Harris, 2004:12-13).  
 
As stated before, many of these branches are interrelated or include similar concepts 
in their programs. Harris argues that the struggle for peace is both at the hands of 
individuals and society: “In contrast to conservatives, who see the origins of the 
problems of violence lying in the individual, peace educator sees the root problem of 
violence lying in broader social forces and institutions that must be addressed in 
order to achieve peace. Although peace education is mostly an individual strategy, 
many of the non-violent strategies that are espoused in peace education classes are 
themselves collective” (Harris, 2004:14). 
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Hossain Danesh presents intergroup, all-integrative, non-discriminating education as 
a basis for a peaceful education, and distinguishes four pillars of thought in peace 
education: changing the mindset, cultivating a set of skills, promoting human rights, 
and defending the environment.  
 
The author argues that the best application for peace education is to use it as a 
framework for the general curricula, implemented in all fields to create a peaceful 
civilization. He argues that the field of peace education is not one suitable to create 
new guidelines, but to identify the negative guidelines currently present in education.  
 
A peaceful environment cannot be reached with violent foundations (Danesh, 
2006:59). In his article, Towards an integrative theory of peace education, Danesh 
mentions the implementation of an EFP (Education for Peace) curriculum in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. 
 
This program focused on gradually removing the sense of fear and resentment 
among the different ethnic groups that were represented in the school by the 
teachers and their students, and indirectly, their parents. Danesh describes several 
activities that the program included: “Conceptual and cognitive instructions; creative 
and artistic presentations; meaningful, effective and sustained dialogue; complete 
transparency and openness; and full appreciation and profound respect for the rich 
and unique cultural heritage of all participants” (Danesh, 2006:61).  
 
According to the author, these activities triggered a reaction in the participants, 
allowing them to slowly open to discussing the physical and psychological wounds 
that the war inflicted on themselves and their families. This is especially important 
due to the differentiation of curricula caused by segregation and indoctrination. 
 
Danesh later argues that peace can be attained when the unity or “oneness” of 
humankind and its diversity is celebrated (Danesh, 2006:69). This is particularly 
interesting, because as it has been mentioned earlier, liberal peace and hybrid 
peace revolve around homogenous/heterogeneous societies.  
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As liberal peace questions the dichotomies good/evil, us/others; and hybrid peace 
celebrates the combination of these two, challenging the homogenization of society. 
Although peace education’s ideas could appear as being heavily influenced by liberal 
peace, here Danesh presents an idea that resides strongly in positive hybrid peace, 
and could be announced as celebrating homogeneity at the same time as 
heterogeneity. 
Critiques of Peace Education 
Peace Education has certain flaws. Its historical link to religion, the lack of a unified 
nomenclature, a universal model, and sometimes the need of conflict as a motivator 
(Bar-Tal, 2002:27-36). This inexactitude is reflected in the considerable difference 
among different programs around the world, which contain different aims, ideas, 
highlights, curricula, subjects and procedures. Bar-Tal argues that even being so 
different, they all have a single purpose, and that is to provoke changes that aim to 
build a better future.  
 
This process goes through strongly diminishing violence and its derivatives, such as 
prejudice, environmental destruction or abuse of human rights (Bar-Tal, 2002:30). 
But the extent of this alteration is highly tied to society. Bar-Tal indicates that peace 
education can be seen as a reflection of the political, economic and social agenda 
for a certain society, and therefore a reaction to the injustices these policies have on 
it.  
 
The author identifies this as a main reason for the diversity of peace education 
programs around the world: different societies, distinct needs, divergent solutions. 
Since to design a peace education program in a democratic society there is a need 
of a consensual agreement agreed by a political party, a certain agenda can seem 
inadequate to certain groups, that may see the application of pro-peace curricula as 
a threat to the establishment, nationalisms, cultural values… And create an 
opposition to it (Bar-Tal, 2002:31-32).  
 
Another negative possibility is the potential indoctrination derived from this kind of 
education. There is a need to keep an open, critical mind, to promote creativity and 
rational thought. Finally, there is a difficulty in evaluating the achievements of peace 
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education, since values and attitudes are hardly accountable. Traditional means of 
evaluation do not work in this particular case.  
 
There is a need for teachers to craft alternative evaluation systems, to record peace 
education’s benefits, and eventually select the best programs. Bar-Tal concludes 
with a reflection on the elusiveness of peace education, that “attempts to develop a 
particular frame of mind, rather than transmitting a body of knowledge” (Bar-Tal, 
2002:37). It is therefore very different from traditional forms of education, and 
perhaps needs flexible and creative forms of teaching and evaluation. 
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Chapter 5: Trenkalòs as a case study 
Introduction 
To answer the research question presented in the previous chapters, there is a need 
to run a thorough analysis of activities carried by the non-profit organization 
Trenkalòs during their almost twenty years of active work in Bosnia & Herzegovina. 
This decision was taken because they represent an unusual example of 
peacebuilding and international grassroots volunteering, perhaps an example of 
positive hybrid peace practice. For that purpose, the theory presented above should 
be sufficient to describe the extent of their peace-related activities. 
The Organization 
Trenkalòs was a non-governmental organization created in 1997 in Barcelona, by 
Jordi Rodrigo and Marta Catalan. The original intent of the association was to 
expose the situation of post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina to the population in Catalonia, 
especially to students. Despite having been a very recent and proximate conflict, the 
awareness of society on subjects such as the existence of refugee camps or the 
impact of anti-personnel mines was almost non-existent.  
 
Their first tour to post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina was during the winter of 1997 and 
constituted of two volunteers and a private car. This early approach aimed to gather 
photographic and audiovisual material in order to capture the effects of war, apprise 
the population and encourage participation and solidarity (Trenkalòs, 2007:12). 
These materials would allow the founding members and their associates to organize 
talks in several education centers, which in turn would promote fundraising and 
volunteering through altruistic organizations.  
 
They believed that the youth was the best audience to implement cooperative 
projects, and the educative framework was perfect means to help them find their own 
tools to participate in the peacebuilding efforts. The material gathered in Bosnia-
Herzegovina was used to elaborate a slideshow which would be presented in 
primary and secondary schools and later developed in more detailed seminars, 
especially about anti-personnel mines.  
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The presenters would carry deactivated artifacts to better illustrate their explanations, 
which had a powerful visual effect on the students. “One could accuse us of radicals, 
but we firmly thought that if the awareness would not arrive in a tangible way to the 
victims, we would fall in some sort of self-assuring exercise” (Marta Catalan in 
Trenkalòs, 2007:13).  
 
These first activities would be performed by Trenkalòs, but soon after several youth 
groups and minor NGOs would organize their own little scale fundraising campaigns. 
Therefore, their activities started with a focus on the Catalan youth. They believed 
that by shocking them with the images and their personal stories they would be more 
interested in participating in international aid and development projects, which 
Trenkalòs could offer knowledge on. 
 
The performance of these seminars could be an example of peace education, but 
they don’t explicitly coincide with the theory mentioned above. Showing images of 
destruction does not explain how to reach peace, or why is it absent. It does not 
provide a set of nonviolent conflict resolution skills. It is not even the adoption of a 
particular curriculum, but sporadic lessons.  
 
This is quite interesting because it does not base the class on avoiding violence, but 
on being aware of it. Some could find comparisons to Harris’ (2004) classification of 
international and developmental education. Certainly, showing images of destruction, 
hunger, or war call for “understanding and common values”, “a sense of belonging to 
a global society, improve the empathic skills of the pupils” and “the adoption of a set 
of beliefs by individuals and the presence of social institutions that provide for an 
equitable distribution of resources and peaceful resolution of conflicts” (Harris, 
2004:10-11).  
 
Therefore, can we name these initiatives peace education? Perhaps with a hybrid 
perspective. If the notion of hybridity is to combine opposed means to produce a 
positive result, it could be argued that if pairing conventional/nonconventional 
methods is enough to foster this change, the organization of war awareness talks is 
an example of peace education. An interesting debate would be to question if 
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showing images of war add to the war-focused education in current society, but the 
addition of a context and experience-based explanations might be enough to 
challenge it. 
Training and Humanitarian Aid 
The first signs of a transformation of the NGO are visible here, and they are 
established with its expansion soon after its creation, including in the title “Grups en 
acció” [Groups in action] to signify the incorporation of several scout organizations, 
and the adaptation of a grassroots structure. From the first contact with local groups 
and individuals in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Trenkalòs starts to receive requests for aid; 
and what began as an educational initiative, grew to an emergency humanitarian aid 
group. In the meantime, they continue to organize talks in schools.  
 
In this fashion, Trenkalòs would act as a middleman organization, providing 
information on the needs of refugees in several locations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
and bringing the resources collected in Catalonia to the country. The focus had 
moved from only Catalonia to also include Bosnian communities. The trip expenses 
were covered completely by the volunteers traveling, and the cargo would be usually 
transported by van. It was meant to be an exchange: volunteer work and monetary 
support for on-the-ground experience and guidance in the country.  
 
This is another example of peace education, and again, it is not carried out in the 
same fashion as those presented in the theory section. Some of these early 
volunteers were not students but trained police officers and professionals of other 
fields. This was practical development and humanitarian aid, and although some 
obstacles resembled those of the peace practitioners of the UN, the scale was much 
smaller.  
 
Although it could be argued that this was an early attempt of service learning, we can 
use Andrew Furco’s (1996) model of service programs to determine the nature of 
this activity. Although the volunteers would learn about the country and witness the 
destruction of war, the beneficiary of the activity was the Bosnian (especially the 
Bosniak) population, and the focus was on serving, rather than learning. Therefore, 
according to Furco, this activity would be classified as volunteerism (Furco, 1996:3). 
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Their grassroots nature also reflected in the way they interacted with the population 
and the different approach they took towards the structure of their activities: “We 
couldn’t afford to do several trips to develop one project. The other NGO, the big 
ones, Americans… they traveled by plane, stayed a week in the field, and spent 
thousands only on surveillance. We had been there dozens of times, and would use 
every trip in which we carried materials to know what the Bosnians needed and 
where. We traveled by van, sometimes several times a year; we knew the routes, the 
people” (Rodrigo, 2015).  
 
The conditions were precarious: due to the low security in the early years after the 
war, one or two members had to sleep in the vehicles to prevent night thefts. Jordi 
Rodrigo, co-founder of Trenkalòs, talks about these harsh conditions “Traveling to 
Bosnia with a convoy might have meant departing from Barcelona on a van on 
Sunday and not getting out until Thursday. Borders, bureaucratic messes, cold, heat, 
hunger, thirst[...] During the early years the border guards were highly corrupt, they 
would take away supplies, material, even toys that we were bringing for the children 
in the camp. You could spend entire days at the border waiting for the officials to let 
you in.” (Rodrigo, 2015). 
 
Perhaps these stories are the easiest to classify since they describe the situation of 
dealing with non-liberal situations to achieve a positive outcome. It would be unfair to 
attribute to Trenkalòs the maintenance of a negative hybrid peace, especially since 
in the early years their peace activities were minimal.  
 
But it is interesting how the presence of non-conventional forms of procedure (road 
transportation, grassroots, border problems…) motivated them to find alternative 
solutions, sometimes being forced to give in some of the donations for the right to 
enter the country (Trenkalòs, 2007:13).  
 
In exchange, they developed a strong relationship with local communities, based on 
authenticity and continuous visits to the country, which is described by Mitchell 
(2008) as one of the keys to establishing long-term cooperation with impoverished 
communities (Mitchell, 2008:60). 
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Rodrigo and the earlier volunteers depict these trips as their most important field 
experience (Trenkalòs, 2007:13), which later would be the base of decision making 
for bigger projects such as Dobro Dosli. This would provide primary knowledge: 
Knowing the fastest routes, the state of the roads, being able to communicate with 
the locals, and most importantly: earning their trust; meant that the expeditioners 
were prevented from any physical harm and that the materials would end up in their 
planned destination.  
 
Some of the early volunteers were members of the Catalan autonomous police, the 
“Mossos d’Esquadra”, who had combat and stress training, and would follow the line 
of command (Rodrigo, 2015). Again, there are signs of hybridity: the 
professionals/volunteers. This could be more controversial, because although they 
were not armed, in the case of a rough encounter with locals, the responsibility 
would fall on the NGO, possibly endangering relations. 
 
In the interviews, Rodrigo often reflects on this point, which was key to avoiding 
tensions between the volunteers and the locals: “They (the volunteers) had to know 
that they were there to help us, and for that, they needed to trust me and follow my 
lead at any time. That was not a stroll in the park, we were in a post-war region, with 
traumatized people and landmines laying around. They came with their ideals, 
thinking that they could fix everything easily, but a word out of place could have put 
our entire work there at risk” (Rodrigo, 2015). He recognizes that from the 
organization they also assumed risks, but argues that on the long run they were 
successful. 
 
The experience of the founders and the first volunteers consisted of a combination of 
collective knowledge and field experience: most of them began their volunteer work 
as students from several fields, photography, pedagogy, history and linguistics 
among others, enough to provide background and support tiny scale projects. The 
field experience came from organizing three to four convoys a year, adapting their 
knowledge of roads, border bureaucracy, local traditions, and language.  
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It also developed contacts and acquaintances with the local population, who served 
as translators and project coordinators. At the point of starting the service learning 
project, Dobro Dosli, the organization had grown enough to require an employee in 
payroll to administer financial records, several cooperation projects, their respective 
private or state fundraising, and the coordination of the two first groups of young 
volunteers on the field.  
 
That position was covered in 2005, almost immediately after the departure of the 
previous person in charge, the founding member Marta Catalan. The new 
administrator was Glòria Marcet, graduated in communication sciences, with a 
masters in humanitarian aid, and experience in the field of international cooperation 
(Marcet, 2016). This is another sign of transformation, especially for an organization 
that had been working in a grassroots structure, and did not have a physical office or 
paid personnel. 
Fundraising 
During that time, the experience accumulated and the wish to keep the awareness 
activities provided the motivation to elaborate a series of written, visual and audio 
material that would later become publications in order to raise funding for projects. 
Among these, there is a collection of comics: El món en un forat, llibres per pensar 
(The world in a hole, books to think), centered on different issues, some of them 
about Bosnia and its refugees, but also reaching to other humanitarian crisis, such 
as child soldiers in Sierra Leone, sweatshops in India, or differences between the 
global North-South.  
 
Although Bosnia-Herzegovina was the main focus of the organization, some 
volunteers participated in humanitarian aid missions in other countries. Personal 
stories of children and adults in Mihatovići, and their everyday problems, such as the 
conditions of the refugee camp, the impossibility to return to their previous homes, 
and the insecurity towards the future.  
 
The comics books were published in both Catalan and English, and although they 
had a simplistic art style, in the end, they appealed the readers to send letters and 
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postcards to the NGO, that would be sent to children in Bosnia. This initiative was 
coordinated with several schools, but at the same time, anyone could participate. 
Again, this falls into the category of peace education, as an extension of the talks in 
schools.  
 
The comic books were used as a means to reach young people, but the stories they 
tell are not especially innocent. In case there was an interest from the audience, the 
comics were at the same time pieces of data and philanthropic tools, since they 
included instructions for teachers to develop awareness programs in schools, such 
as sending drawings and letters to refugees.  
 
Some volunteers were attracted to the organization through this, such is the case of 
Glòria Marcet (Marcet, 2016). Apart from the fundraising aspect, the proactive part of 
sending letters was an idea to counter the feeling of the refugees of being cut off 
from the world, abandoned the international powers (Gassó, 2012). By writing a 
letter not only motivated the students to learn more about what had happened but 
also promoted a culture of solidarity. The fact that there is another person of the 
same age, instead of a vague concept of a victim, has much more power in 
generating empathy (Harris, 2004:10). 
 
Apart from that, they put together a music group, “Trenkaband”, which would perform 
both in Catalonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, playing songs of protest and homage to 
the victims of violence around the world, but especially in Bosnia. Music is a very 
interesting tool for conflict management, since it is a universal language, and has a 
soothing, sometimes exhilarating effect.  
 
Some volunteers mentioned that including the names of the refugees in their songs 
or gifting them CDs would have a deep impact on their relationships. Music was the 
utmost representation of the attempt of Trenkalòs to normalize the lives of the 
refugees, in an attempt to provide moments where the war could be forgotten. They 
not only performed for the refugees, but also for handicapped and ill people in 
hospitals (Gassó, 2014).  
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In 2007, Trenkalòs produced a book, Homenatge a Srebrenica (Homage to 
Srebrenica) that presented their work in Bosnia, illustrated with the photographic 
material collected throughout 10 years of activities in the country. The book also 
included some of the experiences of volunteers, many of which are used in this 
Masters’ Thesis.  
 
Finally, in 2013 they edited a documentary with the same name, using material from 
different years to pay homage to the tragedy of the genocide, and give a voice to the 
refugees. This document is highly interesting since it depicts refugees visiting their 
old homes and bringing up memories of the war, as well as the workings of the Tuzla 
body identification unit, that puts together the corpses of the victims of the genocide. 
 
As has been stated above, the organization was transformed with the inclusion of 
scout groups, which became a pillar of its grassroots structure. These would be not 
only based in Barcelona, but also in other cities, and acted as satellite assets, 
providing both volunteers and fundraising.  
 
Each group would not be able to reach a big amount or people or raise a great 
quantity of money, but combined were enough to fund little projects in Bosnia, and 
collect food or materials needed in the country. They were independent: they 
designed their own projects, organizing benefic meals, marches, anti-war protests, 
and similar local-scale events to raise awareness of the calamities of war (Rodrigo, 
2015). 
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Trenkalòs’ Mentality 
From the early stages of the organization, one can already distinguish several traits 
that have been present throughout the years, and have probably been key to the 
success of the NGO. In summary, these are Knowledge of the environment, 
Efficiency, Hierarchical Structure and Commitment. 
 
As has been stated before, Rodrigo and his people have been to Bosnia & 
Herzegovina manifold, sometimes several times a year. This fact may seem obvious, 
but it is deeper than it may first seem. Him as well as other long-time volunteers 
often mention how the landscape has changed during the past two decades, 
completely disorienting anyone who might have been there years prior.  
 
For example, it affected during the transportation of humanitarian aid: the bridge in 
Slavonski Brod would be destroyed, and they would need to use ferries to cross the 
Sava. Other times, their experience would tell them to cross the border through 
Bihac or Nova Sela, because the border guards would most probably be Bosniak or 
Croat, therefore allowing them through with material for the refugees. 
 
But it also affected their decision making in their peacebuilding activities. When 
deciding who to provide with aid at the refugee camps, they would have to choose 
someone that would speak English, or have some sort of influence, knowledge or 
skills. This was important so that if there was a project on the ground, it would keep 
developing in their absence, or so the volunteers would find something to carry on 
instead of starting all over again. 
 
An example can be found in the summer camps organized in 2016: the difference of 
character between children and young adults in the refugee camp of Mihatovići and 
the rural hamlet of Kamenica. The dramatic situation at the camp, with limited space 
to live and demoralizing future prospects, triggers aggressive and careless attitudes 
in the children. They often dismiss caregivers and spur fights, especially towards the 
smaller, weaker kids.  
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On the contrary, in Kamenica, the older children followed orders and organized their 
younger fellows, as well as looking after them. Knowing this difference allows for the 
organizers to design activities that can fit the two groups, but that focus on different 
facets. It also helps to prevent accidents that could hurt the refugees or damage 
equipment needed later on. 
 
For being an international NGO, Trenkalòs has had very few monetary assets 
throughout its history, although they still demand positive results from each mission. 
Every volunteer pulls their weight, both economically and physically. Everyone is 
given a task that contributes to the overall goal of the day, independently of the 
gender or the age of the volunteer. From lifting equipment to playing the guest, the 
staff expects immediate compliance. Rodrigo argues that grassroots volunteering 
can only work if all the actors play their part, especially peacebuilding since it is an 
effort that cannot be fulfilled by one person only (Rodrigo, 2016). 
 
In sync with the previous point, there is a clear structure that separates the 
organizers from the volunteers. Besides being a relatively safe country, any attitude 
that can cause harm in either the refugees or the volunteers themselves is not 
tolerated. In a similar fashion, resource waste, drug usage or behaviors that affect 
the overall image of the NGO are clearly prohibited, since it is supposed to provide 
role models for the refugees, especially children.  
 
In Mihatovići, habits like smoking or consuming high doses of sugar in food spurs 
illnesses like diabetes, that drop even lowers the quality of life. The volunteers are 
advised to lower their impact as much as possible, for example taking cold showers 
or asking for water when offered soda drinks 
 
The last point is related to long-time efforts and constancy. When volunteers finish 
one iteration of the service learning, they are offered the possibility to undergo 
training to become a speaker for the NGO, and/or a guide for the following year. 
Volunteers are only actively asking to spread their experiences as they return, as a 
way for the Bosniak refugees to be remembered after the war. 
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Nonetheless, as argued before, a grassroots organization is heavily supported by a 
network of active volunteers. Rodrigo has argued that many of their collaborators 
end up not returning to the country, or even stop communicating altogether. The fact 
that volunteers actively help the organization, especially creating initiatives on their 
own, is heavily appreciated in the NGO. 
The scale of the Trenkalòs’ activities 
In 2005, after eight years of activities and experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 
the organized efforts of several individuals and organizations, Trenkalòs launched 
the Dobro Dosli[Welcome] project, which pursued to establish a permanent, 
structured organization on the ground. Once the post-war tensions had settled, and 
the most basic human needs covered, the purpose of the humanitarian aid lost 
ground, and the organization found itself with a success and a failure: being able to 
help the refugees, but leaving them with deep psychological wounds.  
 
This is the final step of the transformation of the NGO, although later it suffered 
some minor changes due to the lack of volunteers. The main goal of the new project 
was to provide emotional support to the victims of genocide and facilitate the return 
of refugees to their previous homes. Since their previous activities mainly revolved 
around helping the refugees in the Mihatovići camp, the majority of them coming 
originally from Srebrenica, it was a strong starting point to work from. 
 
There were several obstacles towards the country’s regeneration, but such a tiny 
organization could not hope to cope with all of them. Therefore, they focused on a 
community already planning their return: the town of Šahbegovići (Grup d’Estudis 
Pedagògics, 2005). To aid them, Trenkalòs planned on shifting the overall mentality:  
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“In 2004, these people had been in the camp for nine years. Without tap water, a 
precarious school, deplorable hygienic conditions… The children had grown up to 
teenagers, smoking on the street, drugs, violence… it had to end. These people 
were from Srebrenica, but we realized we didn’t have the resources or the facilities 
to help them return. So we focused on supporting them psychologically, trying to 
prevent them from going insane. Whoever you confine in a refugee camp in those 
conditions, with little rooms for each family… people lose it. The idea was to 
organize a big stay, from 50 to a 100 (volunteers), to somehow spread a different 
mentality” (Rodrigo, 2015) 
 
The project’s main goals were “To collaborate with the economic and social 
development of BiH, as well as cope with the high rate of unemployment, providing 
basic structure to improve the economy of rural communities and help the return of 
refugees. Train the population in new ways to exploit the land and livestock. Fight 
the ethnic cleansing inflicted in the RS, facilitating the return of refugees. Promote 
coexistence among communities to help adapt the Bosniak ones to the new situation” 
(Grup d’Estudis Pedagògics, 2005).  
 
The organization remarked that it was a Peacebuilding project, with ties to Catalonia. 
“The project of economic invigoration is supported with a program of active witness 
and conflict denouncement, as a platform to develop a positive attitude and an active 
position against human rights violations in young Catalans. Bosnia, such a close, 
and parallel country to Catalonia, is a perfect school” (GEP-Trenkalòs, 2005) 
 
Dobro Dosli was planned for 3-4 years and had three parts. The first and second 
were to activate the area of Sokolac with a rural tourism and an agricultural startup. 
The third part was to build housing for women from Srebrenica that were living with 
their families in refugee camps. The government had been threatened to close those 
facilities since after the war, but Mihatovići is still open in 2016 (Trenkalòs, 2016). 
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Trenkalòs also aimed to provide micro credits for the families to be able to afford to 
house and therefore quickly establishing a safe space to live in. Moreover, Dobro 
Dosli was organized in cooperation with a Catalonia-based program, the youth 
project Grups en Moviment (Moving Groups), that aimed to reinforce associationism 
among young students and promote ideas of peace and human rights.  
 
On one hand, Grups en Moviment established a platform for youths interested in 
cooperation, to organize humanitarian aid collection, design projects, and 
fundraising; on the other hand, it also provided a space for inter-group cooperation. 
In 2005, the joint activity of Grups en Moviment raised 6.423€ through selling comic 
books from Trenkalòs’s collection, fair trade products and solidarity breakfasts (GEP-
Trenkalòs, 2005). This investment was assigned to the community of Sokolac, under 
the management of Sead Duraković.  
 
In the memo of the first phase of the Dobro Dosli project in 2005, Trenkalòs 
addressed the plan to the community of Sokolac, and also to the Catalan and 
Bosnian youths that would take advantage of the housing for summer camps and 
exchanges.  
 
The second and third phases of the project would also have 10 families from the 
Mihatovići camp as beneficiaries, an approximation of the amount of people that 
expressed their will to return. The development of the first phase would be carried on 
between July 2004 and August 2005, and consisted of several points, among them 
refurbish one of the houses to act as a tourism agency, the construction of a barn 
and the purchase of 300 sheep, alongside a few cows and chicken, and the 
performance of several reconstruction and adequacy activities in the village of 
Šahbegovići.  
 
These activities would be followed in the second phase, from July 2005 to August 
2006, starting with the establishment of contracts and cooperation acts with the 
population of Sokolac, and enlarging the previous points with complex infrastructure, 
turning the town as an example for similar enclaves. Finally, the third phase (2006-
2007) would consist in offering micro credits to the returnees for the reconstruction 
and the invigoration of the economy.  
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This project brought a stable flow of income and volunteer workforce to Mihatovići 
and Šahbegovići. The initial project kept developing through the years, and what was 
planned for three to four years became a ten-year process. “When we arrived, there 
was nothing left standing, only a couple of burnt vehicles and the foundations of the 
houses [...] in a destroyed mountain village, the international organizations like UN, 
Red Cross, UNHCR… funded part of the reconstruction, but that was not enough. 
Without windows and insulation, the buildings last a year or two. The locals don’t 
have the money to fix them, but then we come in, we have the resources to finish the 
job” (Rodrigo, 2015). 
 
Between 2005 and 2010, approximately 320 volunteers had attended the summer 
camps, which supposed an average of 4.400€ of summer income to the village of 
Šahbegovići, around 60 to 80 euros per family (GEP-Trenkalòs, 2005). For the 
majority of these families, especially the elderly or female heads of households with 
very limited pensions, that signified a great deal of revenue (Rodrigo, 2015). 
 
Additionally, the Catalan Agency for Development invested around 25,000€ in the 
first phase, 9,000€ in 2007, and in 2008 the Township of Barcelona invested 27,900€ 
(GEP-Trenkalòs, 2010). This money was aimed to the acquisition of livestock, the 
construction of community buildings and the adequacy of private ones, the 
acquisition of technological equipment and the hiring of locals for the maintenance of 
the town’s facilities.  
 
Still, there was a constant problem: “The redistribution of refugees, one goes to 
Sweden, the other goes to his relative's place, another goes home… this makes 
everything complicated, because where you had people who knew the dynamics of 
our work, now you had newcomers”-and there was a similar situation with 
volunteers- “I count that around the 15% of volunteers stayed, and the maximum 
was 3 years. You need to consider some elements, not everyone is fit for this job, 
and there are several who had an interest, but life called them to do other things”. 
(Rodrigo, 2015) 
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Trenkalòs’ Main Projects 
Mihatovići 
The most important bases of activity were the refugee camp of Mihatovići, in Tuzla, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation; and the town of Šahbegovići, in the township of 
Sokolac, Republika Srpska. The head of Trenkalòs, Jordi Rodrigo, remarks often 
how constant presence and emotional support were key to the success in Mihatovići:  
 
“The idea was to somehow spread a different mentality, so the people would notice 
that there are different ways to live[...] And also that they would lose the fear of 
returning to their homes. For the survivors of Srebrenica, going back home meant 
being transported back to the massacre. All those people had deceased and 
disappeared relatives, at a time where they had found only around a thousand 
bodies. Going back was a mental shock for those people. In that we succeeded, with 
a lot of work, accompanying the women to their old homes, and same with the 
burials in Potočari, being by their side. That creates a climate of trust, and a climate 
to overcome fear” (Rodrigo, 2015).  
 
This is perhaps the beginning of the active peacebuilding of Trenkalòs. From the 
initial aim to help the refugees survive, both physically and mentally, there was a 
proactive attempt to change the status quo and promote recuperation. Even though 
the change of attitude was more focused on breaking the monotony of the refugee 
camp than to smooth the relationships with the Serbian Bosnians, accompanying 
them to the Srebrenica memorial and helping them bury their dead often signified 
closure (Rodrigo, 2015).  
 
This is perhaps another example of hybrid peacebuilding since the change of attitude 
often concerned tackling sexist and violent attitudes and the promotion of human 
rights without a visible agenda. Instead of preaching out loud, the volunteers would 
be helping in the house, especially males; and exceptional respect was paid to the 
heads of the households, usually widowed women (Rodrigo, 2015). Therefore, 
although not meddling with political affairs, Trenkalòs’ members would act carefully 
and imperceptibly, giving them an example to follow, but not imposing it. 
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Mihatovići was one the biggest refugee camps built in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which 
experimented a flood of refugees from Srebrenica, and the neighboring towns of 
Zvornik and Bratunac when these areas were attacked by the Serbian army in 1993. 
The center was built by the Norwegian People’s Aid, but funding stopped in 1995 
(Norwegian People’s Aid, 2013).  
 
Laila Zulkaphil, a partner of the Bosnian Women’s Group BOSFAM, does a very 
accurate description of the camp: “Once, the residents of this collective center 
numbered in thousands, but now it is a home to approximately 500 people. Most of 
them are from Srebrenica and the nearby towns such as Bratunac and Zvornik. The 
center consists of two-story houses neatly lined up in rows and colored in blue, pink, 
or yellow.  
 
Each house has four apartments, and each apartment is occupied by one family. 
However, when a large number of people arrived in Mihatovići in 1995, three families 
had to live in one apartment. This meant that up to 20 people shared a small two-
bedroom apartment with an open kitchen and a bathroom. At the refugee center, I 
saw mostly women, children, and elders. The prevalence of households headed by 
females is partly explained by the fact that many of the Mihatovići residents are 
survivors of the Srebrenica massacre” (The Advocacy Project, 2010).  
 
It is particularly difficult to find official information about this location, and the number 
of residents shifts from document to document. Zulkaphil’s description is interesting 
as an insight into the life at the camp, especially having in account that Trenkalòs 
had been previously working there for five years. 
 
“Besides the refugee houses, Mihatovići has two little grocery shops and a primary 
school. When children finish the primary school, they start commuting to Tuzla to 
continue their education. A doctor comes only on Tuesdays, despite a large number 
of sick elders who need regular medical care. When I visited Mihatovići, the 
residents hadn’t had running water for three days; a nearby spring had become their 
only source of water”.  
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“There is no government representation or a person in charge of the collective center. 
If people have a problem such as lack of water, they try to solve it on their own or 
simply wait until the problem is resolved by itself. The government used to provide 
food, clothes, and bus tickets, but now accommodation is the only thing that the 
refugees receive free of charge. Bosnia plans to close all collective centers by 2014 
in order to facilitate the return of refugees”. 
 
“However, many refugees, especially those from the Srebrenica area, do not want to 
return. The complete destruction of the town’s economy, drastic change of ethnic 
composition, and the occasional harassment of returnees make Srebrenica nothing 
like what it was before the war. The government and some aid organizations provide 
assistance to the refugees only if they want to return to their pre-war homes. If they 
choose to live in a different place, they are on their own.” (The Advocacy Project, 
2010) 
 
Francesc Gassó, a guide from Trenkalòs, describes Mihatovići in 2012 as the 
following: “Several identical houses, divided into four apartments, two in each floor. 
They need to fetch drinking water at one kilometer away. The roads are not paved, 
and the electrical cables are in a meager state. On winter, trash is picked up only 
once a month. Nowadays a little family lives in every apartment, but in 1996, two or 
three families used to poorly live in them” (Gassó, 2012).  
 
He carries on with the supposedly temporary nature of those buildings and the 
mental stress these people had to undergo. “to live in that chaotic place, without 
hope, since 1996 (...) cannot produce anything good for this society, despite little 
examples of humanity from time to time. One of the preoccupations of those people 
in 2012 was that the mayor of Srebrenica would be a man that denied the genocide. 
Meanwhile, the rest of Europe turned their backs against them. When Trenkalòs 
arrived there, there had been so many organizations with unaccomplished promises 
that their main goal was to earn the trust of the refugees, in order to work with those 
who had more chances to move on, and therefore start a process of recovery” 
(Gassó, 2012).  
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Another longtime volunteer, Bernat Guixer, also underlines the slow process of 
gaining the trust of the locals, especially with the Dobro Dosli project in Šahbegovići: 
“During the first year (2005) there was a lot of effort to earn the trust of the people, 
the initial wave had only five girls, who also attended the 11th of July.  
 
They were the first to stay in the town, and little by little, that summer, we established 
a more trusting relationship with the neighbors. ‘These people come, pay a sort of 
bed & breakfast, they are good people…’ The first year only a few neighbors offered 
their houses, but the following summers more and more people welcomed them” 
(Guixer, 2016).  
 
The language was a very crucial part of the earlier activities of Trenkalòs in 
Mihatovići. The majority of the refugees would not speak English, except those who 
had learned some words from TV series. Rodrigo fondly remembers one of the 
refugee children, Meliha Sahanić, who would be one of the first people able to 
communicate with them. “This extraordinary girl, knee high to a grasshopper, would 
come and speak English to us. She said she had learned it from the TV. Every time 
that we visited the camp, she would be there to receive us, with a smile on her face. I 
have never met someone so bright in my life. She became our translator, and the 
other kids saw that learning was a good asset for life, and a means to make money.” 
(Rodrigo, 2015)  
 
She and the other kids of the camp would become protagonists of the stories that 
Trenkalòs took home for their fundraising comics, children wondering why there were 
mines in the mountains, or why they could not return to their previous home.  
 
Guixer also remembers alternative ways of communicating: “We spoke in English, 
usually there were some kids that spoke English and Spanish… Spanish! From 
watching South-American soap operas! Or with sign language, because our little 
Serbo-Croatian was horrible. I stayed with grandma Sema, and we would only use 
sign language, but that generated a situation of complicity and non-verbal 
communication[...] it would be easy to understand ‘night’, ‘gunshots’, the direction 
where the soldiers came from…” (Guixer, 2016). 
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Šahbegovići 
Šahbegovići was Mihatovići’s counterpart. Completely destroyed during the war, this 
little rural town in the province of Sokolac, in the Republika Srpska, was partly rebuilt 
with Trenkalòs’ help. This process started through a Bosnian Serb, Sead Duraković, 
a former resident of Šahbegovići. A historical debt moved one of Duraković’s 
neighbors, a Serbian, to warn their Muslim fellows about the Serbian army’s strike, 
and the majority of the inhabitants were able to flee safely.  
 
He later joined the Bosnian army in the defense of Sarajevo, where he fought one 
year. Only one person stayed in Šahbegovići, an old woman named Sema, who 
appears in many of the volunteer’s stories. After the war, Duraković’s family became 
refugees in Spain, and he took several jobs to help them from abroad.  
 
One of them was at the NGO Fondajica Lokalne Demokratije (Foundation of Local 
Democracy for Development of Civil Society) of Sarajevo, the office that managed all 
the humanitarian aid that came from Barcelona. There he met Jordi Rodrigo and 
helped him several times with border customs to allow the humanitarian aid through. 
Once acquainted, Rodrigo inquired about and Duraković’s hometown.  
 
With fear of Bosnian Serb violence against the NGO, Duraković first kept the location 
to himself, but with enough convincing, he sketched a map. Rodrigo, alongside 
Trenkalòs’ members Marta Catalan and Guillem Ibáñez, traveled to Sokolac, in the 
Republika Srpska, and took some time to find the place. The village was completely 
destroyed, only the foundations of the houses remained (Rodrigo, 2016). Duraković 
was a pivotal actor in the development of the service learning program since he was 
one of the first to host volunteers, and became in charge of the maintenance of the 
projects in the absence of Trenkalòs. 
 
From that point on, Trenkalòs designed several projects to rebuild the village and 
improve its economy of subsistence, providing a safer environment to return. “When 
we arrived, UNHCR had just built some of the houses. But they weren’t plastered or 
painted[...]that year we did all the restoration work on the brick facades[...]there was 
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only a causeway, but between that year and the next we built a road layering gravel 
and stones” (Guixer, 2016).  
 
The economy of the village is almost exclusively based in animal husbandry, 
agriculture, and apiculture. Šahbegovići became a crucial part of Trenkalòs’ future 
activities in the country, linking their previous work in Mihatovići with a slightly more 
ambitious goal: the return of refugees. For that purpose, they designed several 
cooperation projects, funded by the Catalan government and the township of 
Barcelona, to adequate the situation of the village for their new dwellers.  
 
They fixed the main road, purchased animals, built two barns and a few houses, and 
painted murals in the refurbished facades. In Homage to Srebrenica (2007), it is 
described how the trust on the local population encouraged Trenkalòs to leave the 
control of the investment on infrastructures, material, and animals to them. “The 
material investments of the project would be propriety of Trenkalòs, given for the 
exploitation to the community of Šahbegovići.  
 
The outcome during the five first years would be 70% to the benefiters, 30% to 
Trenkalòs, and with the goal to invest 20% of the organization’s gains to re-invest in 
purchases and maintenance of the infrastructures” (Trenkalòs, 2007:85). Their work 
culminated with the purchase of a tractor from the Bosnian Serbs, perhaps the most 
important post-war commercial trade between Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs in the 
area. To tie all these little projects together, to help facilitate the reconstruction and 
attract the locals, they created the Dobro Dosli project. 
 
Dobro Dosli Project 
 
The Dobro Dosli project is the flagship project of Trenkalòs after 2005, and it is 
based strongly on a service learning component. Although it has been organized 
intermittently from 2011, it has been their strongest asset in the country. The 2016 
iteration was organized in the following fashion: 
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6-7 July - Sarajevo - Meeting point in Sarajevo (Evening visit to the Bascarcija, 
Official introduction to the summer camps, Talk with Jovan Divjak[Commander of the 
defence of Sarajevo during the war], Visit to the wartime hotspots[Jewish graveyard, 
Grbavica neighborhood, Sniper alley & Oslobodenje newspaper among others], visit 
to the center for the handicapped Oaza), and moving to the Mihatovići Camp (Tuzla 
Canton). 
 
7-8-9 July - Mihatovići - Preparation for the Mihatovići Fashion Night (8 July) and the 
Srebrenica Memorial (9 July) Other activities: Games and hot chocolate for the 
children, a clown show, a workshop on health and food, a fruit eating contest, among 
others.  
 
10-11 July - Bratunac & Srebrenica - Moving from Mihatovići to Bratunac (Vlasenica 
Canton). Visit the Srebrenica Memorial Site in Potočari. Visit the Srebrenica 
Memorial act on the anniversary of the Massacre of 1995. From Bratunac to 
Kamenica (Vlasenica Canton). 
 
12 July - Kamenica - Games and hot chocolate for the children. From Kamenica to 
Šahbegovići (Sarajevo-Romanija Canton). 
 
13-16 July - Šahbegovići - Overall maintenance of the village (painting fences, 
repairing facade murals and cleaning the graveyard). On the 15th, visit Sarajevo for 
the presentation of the book “Olovkis, a Bosnian Story” at the Dječiji dom Bjelave 
orphanage. 
 
17 July - From Šahbegovići to Sarajevo. Official closure of the summer camp. 
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Trenkalòs, Catalonia and Bosnia 
Although it is mentioned many times throughout this Master’s Thesis, Trenkalòs can 
be only considered a Spanish NGO coincidentally. This is especially relevant when 
considering their relationship to Bosnia & Herzegovina. 
 
This tendency started with Jordi Rodrigo, who had a strong activist past in the matter 
of the defense of the Catalan language. Following short, many volunteers from 
Trenkalòs were part of scout groups, a strong tradition in Catalonia which was linked 
to the Catholic church, but also had its secular counterparts. Both of these groups 
were strongly tied to Catalan traditions and language, a strong appreciation for 
nature and a sense of community, therefore aligned to Trenkalòs’ member’s ideas. 
 
It is no coincidence, then, that the NGO’s members became engaged with Bosnia & 
Herzegovina from the first moment. Like Catalonia, Bosnia is situated at a 
crossroads between large economic, political, cultural and religious powers. They 
both share a history of conflict and adaptability, and also one of a struggle over 
identity.  
 
Despite being Muslim, the Bosniak are by far the most representative in this 
similitudes. They lost a civil war that almost completely annihilated them, and were 
pulled apart by neighboring countries. Like Bosnia, Catalonia is pursuing a path 
towards independence. Not in vain do the first advice caution, since they already 
paid a blood tax to fulfill theirs, and did not end well. 
 
The two countries are located in the Mediterranean, and share similar cultures, in 
fact, the majority of the Bosniak have similar facial features as anyone in Southern 
Europe. Besides Trenkalòs, Catalonia has a special relationship with Bosnia & 
Herzegovina. During the Olympics in Barcelona in 1992, the township of the city put 
their efforts into bringing a Bosnian team, while the Bosnian War had recently started, 
and athletes would not be allowed to travel. After the war, Barcelona destined 
considerable amounts of aid to Sarajevo, called District 11, in relation to Barcelona’s 
10 districts.  
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After the cease of the aid in 2004, the organization was passed to the hands of the 
Bosnians and turned into the Fondacija Lokalne Demokratije, or Foundation for Local 
Democracy, an organization that coordinated aid coming from Catalonia and acted 
as a link with the local authorities, whom Trenkalòs worked tightly. This same 
organization is where Sead Durakovic first met Jordi Rodrigo, which spurred the 
reconstruction of Sahbegovici, and the Dobro Dosli Project. 
 
The aid coordinated by the FDL was destined to rehabilitate the Olympic facilities in 
Zeta and the Olympic neighborhood of Mojmilo, where 1.647 apartments were 
repaired (El Periódico, 2015). 
 
A Critic of Trenkalòs 
 
Although I find it hard to criticize Trenkalòs for their methods, there are flaws that 
could have helped improve facets of the NGO. The first is that they did not build up a 
documental archive alongside the development of the NGO. This highly complicates 
the task of understanding their finances, the quantity of trips that the volunteers went 
to Bosnia & Herzegovina and their work there, the number of associations that 
worked with them, or the amount of refugees that they motivated to move back to 
their old homes in the Republika Srpska.  
 
It also difficulties reproducing memories since sometimes long time volunteers mix 
up their experiences, dates, or people in their anecdotes. This includes their website, 
which was shut off in 2013, and contained a lot of information about the summer 
camps, as well as pictures. 
 
Another flaw is perhaps the management of the volunteers’ PTSD after they return to 
Catalonia. All volunteers convey to experience some sort of post-traumatic stress 
after the summer camps. Although the organizers offer their help in the form of 
emotional support, it is not a compulsory activity, such as the ones in the summer 
camps. 
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There is a comment made by one of the long-time volunteers, Bernat Guixer, who 
questioned the ultimate goal of the NGO. If the target was to improve the situation of 
the refugees to a point where they could return to having normal lives, how does it 
combine with the continuous visits to the country? The question is if Trenkalòs is a 
needed support for their eventual return to normality; or a dependency the refugees 
developed that prevents them from standing on their own feet? Guixer’s thought 
pointed more at the eventual end of the missions and how would that affect the 
refugees, but it goes without saying that the constant present of the NGO is one of 
the key aspects of their success. 
 
Finally, there are a couple of observations that could be interesting to explore. 
Trenkalòs has focused on the Bosniaks since the start, and besides some honorable 
mentions, the volunteers do not meet Bosnian Croats or Bosnian Serbs. In hardline 
Serb areas like Sokolac, Trenkalòs has had rough experiences with the locals; and 
Rodrigo has mentioned that Croat border guards did a number on them on several 
occasions.  
 
Still, it would be interesting to hear their stories, even if it was to hear that there were 
no genocides, to be able to contrast them with the others. If Trenkalòs has had 
arranged meetings between Bosnian Serbs and Bosniaks in the past, knowing about 
these experiences could be of some good towards inter-community relationships. 
The future of Trenkalòs 
As it has been previously argued, Trenkalòs started little, but it developed 
considerably quickly. After expanding to the Dobro Dosli Project, the NGO reached 
its peak of activities, that dwindled up until today. Although the groups still organize 
summer camps, the number of volunteers is low, and the exhaustion of the 
organizers is more evident. 
 
The question then is, has Trenkalòs any future prospects? The answer was 
presented by the organizers themselves, and the obstacles lie on the foundations of 
the NGO itself: 
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- Funding 
Although Trenkalòs is a grassroots organization with little to no funding, it still has to 
be registered to the census in Spain, which represents a fee. The same goes for the 
maintenance of a webpage, and the production of books. All of these activities are 
affected by taxes, and if the organization is not able to pay, it cannot continue its 
activities. Trenkalòs as a registered organization is officially bankrupt. This highly 
limits its capabilities to obtain funding from public institutions, and therefore any 
bigger projects in Bosnia. 
 
There is another problem: According to Trenkalòs members, in Spain, bookstores 
that acquire books can return them to the seller at any point in time, which they do if 
they are not able to sell them. In some occasions, the NGO had already used the 
money for projects in Bosnia when the libraries returned the books and asked for a 
refund. They were able to return the money, but that experience stopped them from 
using that fundraising method. 
 
- Leader-based NGO/Personal Toll: 
Although it has a directive board, the weight of the NGO heavily relies on a person 
who is experienced, has contacts and resources, and is good in decision making. 
For Trenkalòs, that person is Jordi Rodrigo, and so far no one else has stepped up 
for a possible continuity of his project. In the same line, the continuous activities in 
Bosnia & Herzegovina force the persons responsible of the NGO to strongly commit 
to a cause, limiting their life choices. Rodrigo has made of Bosnia his life project, but 
it has represented a strong weight in his health. 
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Chapter 6: The volunteers’ experiences 
The volunteers from the different groups linked to Trenkalòs had several compulsory 
theory courses that would involve training in many different areas. From the history 
of Ex-Yugoslavia and the massacre of Srebrenica, cooperative economy, anti-
personnel mines and a practical demonstration of de-mining, a practical course on 
coexistence and Bosnian culture, a planning on the activities they would do in the 
summer camps, and the projection of several documentaries and material that 
Trenkalòs had been gathering over the years. They also invited previous volunteers 
to discuss their experiences, not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina but also other parts of 
the world where Trenkalòs had been present sporadically.  
 
Although the courses were short, the objective of them was to introduce the 
volunteers to a completely different country to palliate the initial shock, and to 
prevent them from inflicting any negative effects on the project. “When we taught 
them, the conflict, the history, the economy of subsistence… it was so they 
understood that it was a different culture, a different religion, that they had to be 
open-minded. That didn’t prepare them for what they would experience in Bosnia. 
Watching documentaries or reading books does not prepare anyone to see what 
happened there. It does not matter if you are young or not, there is always an 
emotional impact” (Marcet, 2016). 
 
They would receive the practical training on the ground, by observing and 
participating in activities, sharing time and space with the locals, and visiting various 
locations, such as the war front in Sarajevo and the genocide memorial in Potočari. 
They would cover the whole cost of their travel expenses, and would provide a daily 
rent income for their hosts. This aimed to promote commitment and formal behavior, 
as well as revitalize the local economy.  
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Their tasks would be simple, to prevent exhaustion: “We have to consider that we 
are talking about Srebrenica, it’s a genocide, it’s not building a well. They are still 
unearthing mass graves. Our guys were meeting people who had written the History, 
sometimes in blood. Tourism is one thing, but living with them for two weeks, in their 
houses, eating with them, sleeping with them, you understand things in a whole 
different manner” (Rodrigo, 2015).  
 
They were also warned about a possible post-stress disorder when withdrawn from 
that situation to their previous reality: “Everyone doubts if they can take such a 
mental challenging trip, but no one expects that the hardest part is to go back.  (In 
Bosnia) we have everything planned, our limits, the places we take them, everything 
is under control and it works. But when they come back, physically and mentally 
exhausted, no one understands what they have been through” (Rodrigo, 2015) 
 
In Sarajevo, the volunteers would meet the Bosnian upper class, highly educated 
and trained; in Mihatovići they faced the reality of displaced persons and their 
uncertain future; and Šahbegovići, the last stop, showed them a completely different 
reality (Rodrigo, 2015).  
 
It was a two-track project: first, it was set to be an example, a town where refugees 
could go back to, or that would encourage them to return to their homes and repair 
them. Secondly, it was an economic project: fundraise a self-sustainable economy 
based on livestock, as well as design a tourism project (GEP-Trenkalòs, 2005). 
Although the latter did not succeed due to bureaucratic difficulties and 
disagreements within the organization, the main road was repaired, several of the 
houses were rebuilt and attracted new settlers, the majority of them Bosnian Muslims.  
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Other projects did not work due to the lack of trained personnel: “We needed 
someone in Šahbegovići to supervise the projects through the year, but our contacts 
among the young Bosnians didn’t want to live in the countryside, and our volunteers 
would have to stop their studies or careers for too long. One of the projects was to 
contract an internet service, so they could continue their studies abroad, but that 
went through the government of Sokolac, and they didn’t want to hear a word. We 
had brought a pump to acquire free running water from the well, but nowadays 
everything runs through Sokolac, and they are increasing the taxes to a level that the 
locals can’t afford any more” (Rodrigo, 2015). 
 
The volunteers who would eventually repeat the experience would be trained to 
become group leaders, and eventually trainers themselves. Generally, there would 
be talks every day in the summer camps, and every guide would explain tasks or 
information for about 10 minutes, and then the groups would rotate, the group would 
leave, and another one would come (Rodrigo, 2015). This would give the guides 
short breaks and make sure the information would be transmitted.  
 
These individuals would be also hired to do talks and conferences once back in 
Spain. “They would keep expanding the projects. There were youths from Barcelona, 
la Seu d’Urgell, Manresa… they presented the project in their own city, they would 
project documentaries, talks… we provided them the materials that Trenkalòs had 
produced, and they would create a network, it was like a stain that grew and joined 
others. And then they would come to organize the summer camps, do talks to the 
volunteers, tell about their experience, and once in the camps, they would help to 
coordinate, providing support…” (Marcet, 2016). 
 
The process would be self-feeding if some guides would not continue, new 
volunteers would take over. The organization in the camps was hierarchical, the 
word of the project coordinators would be law, but the guides would have to 
supervise the volunteers and make sure that nothing dangerous happened. This was 
organized so there would be a minimal impact on the good relations between the 
organization and the locals, and to ensure the continuity of the project. Faults would 
be punished with immediate expulsion.  
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This structure failed to hold when traveling back since many of the volunteers 
belonged to other organizations. Unfortunately, it hindered the archival part of 
Trenkalòs, limiting the pool of available volunteers and the acquisition of feedback, 
which is very limited nowadays. “I believe that the impact of the volunteers was 
positive, considering that it was a controlled environment. I don’t think that the 
volunteers helped in the mediation between Bosniaks and Serbs, and maybe they 
did not improve the chances of returning refugees, they didn’t have such a big 
impact. But they did affect them emotionally, you could see it in the refugees, in the 
happiness, the joy, the cultural exchange… the young people that stayed in Sarajevo 
moved to the camp or Šahbegovići when we were there, the grandparents would see 
their grandchildren… everyone came to enjoy those moments” (Marcet, 2016). 
The Volunteers’ Perspectives 
Having presented the majority of the NGO’s activities, now we move forward towards 
the second part of the analysis, the volunteers’ perspectives. The experiences 
accumulated here are separated into three groups: Organizers, long-time volunteers, 
and short-time volunteers. 
 
As it is natural, the more time volunteers spent in the country, the deeper their 
understanding was. Nonetheless, it is interesting to see in what areas they put more 
emphasis in. Especially interesting is the idea of success. Did they have different 
ideas? Did they consider their presence in the country positive? Did they think it 
could have been different? 
Organizers 
This section will be focused on the administrators of Trenkalòs. The information will 
be drawn both from the book Homage to Srebrenica (2007) and the interviews it 
contains, and also material that was given to the volunteers before the camps. A per 
the interviews, the following will be used: the co-founder and director of the 
organization, Jordi Rodrigo; and the coordinator of the first service learning mission 
alongside Rodrigo, Glòria Marcet.  
 
When writing about their experiences, interests, and reflections, it is important to 
remember that Rodrigo is the member who spent the most time in Bosnia-
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Herzegovina, has been a member of the organization for seventeen years. When 
assessing his impressions, I took in account that this project is very dear and 
personal to him. Glòria Marcet began in the organization right at the start of the 
service learning project. She spent almost four years as an active member of the 
organization, supervising the funding, registry documents, recruitment and training of 
volunteers, and other activities, as the first full-time employee of the NGO.  
 
One of the interesting faces of the book Homage to Srebrenica (2007) is that it 
showcases the earlier impressions and strategies of the organization. “The motto 
‘The one who wants to help can do more than the one who can help’ became a true 
religion for us. In fact, the goal of our entity[...] was to raise awareness and train 
young Catalans that were interested in cooperation projects as a tool for personal 
development and to help victims of wars or natural disasters.  
 
The idea was to make a little photo report to enrich the talks in high schools and 
scout groups” (Jordi Rodrigo in Trenkalòs, 2007:12) “We started to focus only 
exclusively on working with schools and high-schools, because we thought that in 
youth we would find the best responses[...]Then we offered a series of proposals to 
the students so after watching the presentation they could do something else, 
transcend the pure explanations” (Marta Catalan in Trenkalòs, 2007:13).  
 
In the book, the organizers talk about reaching a point where distinguishing the 
differences between the 1st and 3rd world was inevitable, since their experiences 
were even worse than they imagined “In consequence, the ways to face these 
realities could be in many cases as hard and surprising as the crude reality of Bosnia, 
where the dialogue, volunteers, and the solidarity spirit was not like we would have 
wished for” (Jordi Rodrigo in Trenkalòs, 2007:13).  
 
They argue that the energy of the youth was better used for active participation in the 
ground, instead of planning from home. The first ideas were to develop some sort of 
model that would be attractive for the youth, but effective at the same time, and 
intertwined with experiential learning. “It was evident that in the world of cooperation 
there was a terrible adjustment between theory and practice. We wanted that the 
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center of our actions would be knowledge derived from experience” (Marta Catalan 
in Trenkalòs, 2007:14).  
 
To develop that project, they used a mentality of a private company. This idea had 
consequences for the volunteers, who would be asked to cast aside personal 
philosophies and follow orders. Therefore, there was a hierarchy, to improve the 
chances of positive results, not as a secondary outcome, but as the principal goal. In 
the book, the “mainstream” structures of NGOs are deemed “inefficient and not 
serious, with lots of debate and propositions, but a deficient leadership” (Trenkalòs, 
2007:15).  
 
According to them, Trenkalòs offered a project ready to take to the ground, with a 
practical focus on the youth. It is interesting how they summarize the process of 
thought and development in such a hurried manner. It resembles the straightforward 
language used in some of their documents and explanations. They prime the 
experience over everything and cut volunteers from any decision making. 
Unfortunately, their description of the evolution of their line of thought can be 
confusing, especially when trying to distinguish a chronological thread. 
 
An example of the straightforward language used previously can be found in issued 
instructions for every service learning mission. Nevertheless, they offer explanations 
for every particular order. The issue analyzed here belongs to this year’s edition, 
2016. “You can take pictures, but ask first. If there are soldiers or police they have a 
very bad temper, and they can take your camera, your choice. Don’t try to play smart 
and record with your phone thinking that you won’t be seen; either we take pictures 
openly or we don’t” (Trenkalòs, 2016:4).  
 
They attribute prestige to the organization, and warn the volunteers of their 
responsibility: if they cross the line, it won’t be them but the whole operation which 
will be affected. They also criticize selfish behaviors like calling or checking the 
phone often. When it comes to personal hygiene, the organization warns about the 
usage of the facilities “There are showers and we can take them, but if it’s not strictly 
necessary we will avoid it, and in any case, never with warm water. The 
infrastructures are in a very bad state if we were to damage the system, once the 
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winter comes they would not have warm water, or it would be very expensive to 
repair” (Trenkalòs, 2016:8).  
 
There is a similar attitude when it comes to food or water “If during the transport we 
don’t eat, we will ‘suck it up’ and do it when possible. At the camp they sometimes 
offer drinks. Soda-type of drinks are usually disgusting, but if they fill your glass, you 
drink. Milk is a luxury if they don’t offer it, never ask for it. Don’t ask for anything 
that’s not essential.” (Trenkalòs, 2016:10).  
 
Finally, they recommend bringing chocolate powder, soap, dental paste, or toilet 
paper to “forget” in the hosts’ houses. Therefore, they pay exclusive attention to the 
consequences of the volunteers’ passing through the camp and stress the need to 
show an open attitude, willing to listen as much as possible. To leave the place and 
its people in a better state than they were, not the opposite. 
Jordi Rodrigo 
Jordi Rodrigo, aka “Rodri”, is the co-founder and director of Trenkalòs. His name has 
been appearing repeatedly in this master’s thesis since he has been the main source 
of information from the organization. His experiences and impressions have 
undoubtedly changed during the course of his years in the field, and the evolution of 
the NGO.  
 
He has been in charge of several projects, among them the music group Trenkaband, 
the edition of the books and comic books of the organization, and the setting of the 
NGO’s projects, both development and service learning; the acquisition of detailed 
information was difficult. He did not only travel to Bosnia & Herzegovina for the 
summer camps but also to prepare and perform several reconstruction and 
development activities.  
 
His way of speaking is direct, sometimes harsh, imposing his opinions. Also, he often 
criticizes academic or theoretical approaches, since he considers that the practical, 
on-the-ground knowledge is a superior method. But when he interacts with the 
Bosniaks, one can see the appreciation they have for him.  
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He and his fellows were motivated to develop the NGO to improve the knowledge 
about the Bosnian War in Spain, and to give a tool to schools to be able to help as 
well: “In every talk without exception, the students asked us what they could do to 
help, and we realized that the teachers did not have an answer for them. We 
developed little programs so the children could have a project. More people got 
interested in it, the organization grew, and there it started a pedagogical work. The 
kids would develop a project, get funding, food, clothes… and then we would take it 
there. When we started contacting scout groups we realized that they already had 
little projects, and it was easier to create the link. They acted as our branches” 
(Rodrigo, 2015). 
 
The first volunteers would not be professionals, but a growing organization, they 
needed to adapt: “We were young people, everyone did what they could. When the 
thing started growing considerably we realized we could have a person in payroll, 
and an office. That means that you need constant income. When we started 
publishing books we found legal problems, taxes… a volunteer busts you, you need 
a professional” (Rodrigo, 2015).  
 
Rodrigo describes how every volunteer of Trenkalòs would be trained on the ground, 
splitting the price of gas or rent with the others to travel to Bosnia. “At the same time 
they received training, they saw the problems at the borders, bombed bridges, zones 
controlled by one army or the other. These people were half-professionals, but they 
were very well trained. We are talking about the end of the 90’s, beginning of the 
2000's, no one knew anything about mines. We had been on the ground for several 
years and knew people in Bosnia that were professionals in the field. It’s not theory, 
something you tell someone and the other tells it to another person” (Rodrigo, 2015). 
 
It didn’t matter if they were organizing trips to Bosnia or going to talk in a school, all 
of them had been in Bosnia before. This philosophy of practical knowledge in 
exchange of personal investment is something that Rodrigo stresses continuously, 
and is a core characteristic of service learning. Even though the summer camps 
were not designed yet, this idea was probably born in those early concepts.  
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Rodrigo argues that one of the major obstacles at the beginning was communication, 
heavily limited by the scarcity of English-speaking Bosnians. “The first idea was to 
communicate with them, understand what they needed. It was difficult to assimilate 
the level of destruction in the country: Political, economic, physical, of Bosnia and its 
people. In the 90’s in Sarajevo there were few people who spoke English, but in the 
outskirts, there were almost none. That provoked tremendous communication 
problems. We started with our own intuition, and after knowing the point of view of 
the people it went developing. Also, there was a huge separation between the 
people of Sarajevo and the countryside” (Rodrigo, 2015). 
  
He deems the government officials and international representatives to have been 
ignorant of the situation of the rural population, an information he claims to have 
known better. He recognizes that taking these decisions were risky and that the 
consequences of failing would have been definitive for the NGO. But he argues that 
with such an ephemeral situation, very limited funding and personnel, there were few 
options. He criticizes bigger organizations for taking wrong decisions with much 
more funding, with investments that ended up being unsuccessful.  
 
Then from the transportation of humanitarian aid comes the desire to go further, and 
help the refugees somehow more. “There are so many objectives in a place where 
there’s nothing left, that there’s everything to be done, and you feel helpless. The 
drama of the Bosnian War is the ethnic cleansing. The division of the country, people 
can’t go home. The economic reconstruction is a state matter, but the NGOs can’t do 
it. If people would not return in 10 years, the conflict would reactivate. These people 
had been in a refugee camp for too long, without drinking water, a school in 
shambles, violence, drugs… These were the people of Srebrenica, but we were 
conscious that we didn’t have resources or means to help them return. So we 
focused on supporting them psychologically, tried to prevent them from going crazy” 
(Rodrigo, 2015).  
 
This is an interesting point, with the inability to help refugees on a bigger scale, they 
tried to focus on a root of the problem: the everyday. If these people are unable to 
follow the neoliberal markets’ style of work, an economic reconstruction would be 
insufficient. It also affects return, if they are fearful or dreaded by the phantoms of 
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war, there is little chance that they wish to move back to their previous homes. 
Accompanied, widowed women could go and visit their old homes, otherwise 
impossible. If they managed to bring a considerable amount of active, excited young 
people, they would probably be able to change the everyday for a short period of 
time.  
 
The question is, would it be enough to provoke a major change in the refugees’ 
lives? Rodrigo argues that staying for longer would have been counterproductive 
“We saw that we could exhaust the refugees, we are talking about little houses, with 
families of five or six members. Also, if you bring people to train them, you can’t lock 
them there, because that is not Bosnia” (Rodrigo, 2015). The volunteers would be 
traveling to different locations, but the stay at the refugee camp and the town of 
Mihatovići would be the main parts of the summer camps. Rodrigo calculates that 
throughout the years they brought about six hundred volunteers, although according 
to Trenkalòs’ register from 2005 to 2010 only about a quarter of those were in the 
service learning program (GEP-Trenkalòs, 2005).  
 
When it comes to the training of volunteers before going to Bosnia, they decided to 
go to the essence of everything. With limited time and resources, Rodrigo argues 
that the experience gathered is enough to determine what to teach, and the 
seminars are very summarized. “Until you go there and realize what’s going on, you 
don’t understand the real problems” (Rodrigo, 2015).  
 
He regrets that a big part of the volunteers stops their activities after one round “The 
majority of people are not made for this. Then there are those who realize that this 
means to make a compromise, and they cannot assume it. Of those who want to do 
it, there are people who can’t. One thing is to go there and see a disaster one day, 
the problem is to go there every year, coexist. One of the things that kills me is to be 
there and to see generations come and go, and that the problem remains or worsens. 
It’s Srebrenica, you’re not building a well. It’s a drama of gigantic proportions” 
(Rodrigo, 2015).  
 
He also comments on the volunteers coping with the trip, but he pinpoints the 
hardest part in the return “Everyone doubts if they can face such a situation, but the 
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terrible part is the return. In Bosnia, everything is arranged, we know to what extent 
we can stretch them, where to go, we bring them to very specific places. They are 
overcharged with these experiences[...]then they go back and then they think that 
since they have been going through all that, the people will welcome them, help 
them. And it’s the opposite, people do not want to hear stories, they want to go to the 
beach and party. There is always a bit of jealousy, these guys going to Bosnia, 
burying people and doing whatnot… the doors get closed. We talk to them about 
PTSD, but everyone understands better at home. People don’t want to hear anything 
about the poor people of Bosnia. People chose, and they chose home” (Rodrigo, 
2015). 
 
Marcet’s experiences in Bosnia & Herzegovina were strongly linked to the 
organization and its effects towards both the locals and the volunteers. She felt 
touched by the personal stories of the refugees: “Trenkalòs had a beautiful project, 
with such a dedicated people… I remember being in Mihatovići and Šahbegovići, 
sharing with the families, when they tell you what happened, and to see the 
volunteers at work[...]When you arrive at the refugee camp it’s quite desolating, it 
makes you think about these families, these kids, living here for god-knows-how-
much time” (Marcet, 2016).  
 
She qualified the impact of the service-learning program as positive, but limited 
considering the scale of the operation and the real capacities of the volunteers: “It 
didn’t have a direct impact on the return of the refugees or the mediation between 
the Bosniaks and the Bosnian Serbs in Šahbegovići, but it had an emotional 
influence[...]When you saw those people laugh, enjoy, they had exchanges that 
otherwise they would have never had” (Marcet, 2016).  
 
She attributed the success in peacebuilding to the development projects, that 
provided an infrastructure and tools for the refugees to sustain themselves: “We built 
a farm, bought the animals [...]but even then, the projects were fleeting, we would 
not be there forever. You do not solve the people’s problems, it is temporary, they 
need to move on by themselves” (Marcet, 2016).  
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Marcet doubted that the volunteers would have enough training to understand the 
conflict, but argued that the organization taught them enough that they would 
understand how to behave in the culture, the religious differences, the functioning of 
the house, etc. “Still, once you are there, it’s shocking, no matter how old are you. 
Even if someone has told you about the violence, the massacre, once you see it 
firsthand… no one can explain to you that feeling. It depends on each person, some 
can cope with it better, some are more easily impressed” (Marcet, 2016).  
 
Once the volunteers would finish their activities and return, some would want to 
continue in the NGO. “The guides became members of Trenkalòs and kept 
expanding the project. Since many were from scout associations, they came from 
different cities[...]they would talk about the project, the conflict in Bosnia, and 
organized talks in their municipalities” (Marcet, 2016).  
 
The organization would provide them with photographic material, presentations, 
short films, and once the next summer camp would come up, they would participate 
in preparing the explanations, organizing the training for the volunteers, and joining 
the camps as aides for the organization.  
 
It is interesting to note that the volunteers were not provided emotional support apart 
from casual meetings with other members. “A lot of them manifested the intention to 
keep collaborating, and we had a couple of meetings in Barcelona, kept in touch with 
the associations, so they could contact us if they felt that they were not understood. 
The majority of people, once they go back home, feel that their family or friends don’t 
empathize with the stories and impressions they learned in Bosnia”  
 
“So in keeping their link to the organization they had more tools to cope and help the 
people whom they shared so many emotions with[...]There are always some people 
who don’t want to continue, either because they can’t manage the emotions, or for 
their own reasons. But living it like that, from that emotional perspective, does make 
them continue, transmit what they lived, organize speeches, and help them as much 
as possible” (Marcet, 2016). 
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Long Time Volunteers 
This section will contain the experiences of two long-time volunteers, Bernat Guixer 
and Francesc Gassó. In the organization, this position is tagged as ‘Guide’ or 
‘Guides’, and they were in charge of tasks often different than the regular or short 
time volunteers, such as performing explanations, supervising activities, or leading 
discussions.  
 
Guixer was part of the first service learning camps, during the second part of July 
2005. He participated in the service learning program several years and did talks in 
educational centers as well. Gassó attended the training for volunteers of Trenkalòs 
in 2011, and from there he participated in three rounds, the last being in 2016. 
 
Gassó considers the camps as a practical experience to “better understand the 
human condition” (Gassó, 2016). In his text, he reflects on the conversations with the 
youth in the refugee camp, especially in that they felt that society had forgotten about 
them and that there was no future. Gassó is often impressed by the process of the 
organization, and the amount of effort invested in the country.  
 
He argues that Trenkalòs was a piece more of the reconstruction, and its continuity 
earned the trust of those who have been so many times deceived. “It was an 
organization that was there because they believed in what they were doing, instead 
of ticking requirements off of a list to receive funding” (Gassó, 2016).  
 
He appreciates the direct language often used by the organization as a tool to shake 
the passive attitudes of the volunteers and create uncomfortable debates as a bath 
of reality. Also, he considers the service learning program as a maturity trip and the 
increment of social responsibility. “One needs a trip like this to understand many 
things, especially what an ex-combatant told us: one can only understand war when 
one has lived it. Thanks to Trenkalòs I had the chance to learn a part of the recent 
history of Europe, and their cooperative work to fight against the military objectives of 
the genocide, bringing a little hope where there was none” (Gassó, 2012).  
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In his travel logs, Gassó offers descriptions of the border customs, Sarajevo, the 
refugee camp of Mihatovići, Potočari, and the town of Šahbegovići with a spice of 
history. He also describes the hospitality of the locals in Mihatovići, and cultural and 
economic cues, such as taking the shoes off when entering a house, or sitting on the 
floor, although he describes these situations as normal.  
 
In fact, he is more surprised by the fact that their hosts offered their rooms to the 
guests, and slept in sofas. Back in Sarajevo, he describes how the training of the 
volunteers was supported by local experts in several fields, who met the volunteers 
and explained different parts of the Bosnian history, and the political, social, 
economic and cultural spheres.  
 
Then he reflects on the difficulty to develop and maintain projects with such limited 
societal infrastructures. When in Šahbegovići, he observes affection and gratitude 
between the locals and the volunteers who have already visited Bosnia, especially 
Rodrigo. “I share the table with men who have been in the trenches four years, who 
have survived and maybe they didn’t want to[...]There are also women raped by 
soldiers, how to bring back the dignity to these people?” (Gassó, 2012)  
 
His hosts do not have enough to feed the whole household, so the guests get to eat 
while they fast, although the food is abundant. As a vegan, the continuous presence 
of meat is a challenge. In his second blog, he is already a volunteer guide and has 
responsibilities like preparing activities or talks. Again, the experiences with refugees 
are the highlight, especially when they talk about the war.  
 
When it comes to Bernat Guixer, he speaks more about his position as a guide, 
especially towards the other volunteers. As they were few in proportion to the 
volunteers, each had to prepare specific topics to be explained during the summer 
camps. “I went into detail with the Srebrenica massacre. I spent hours talking to Jordi, 
and I did a lot of research on books and newspapers about that topic. The training, in 
the end, was pretty exhaustive because since at the camps we observed many 
different topics… it wasn’t like a class, where you sit down and the teacher tells you 
the lesson. We shared with the people, learned as a group, and took from different 
sources” (Guixer, 2016).  
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He mentions a sense of debt towards the organization and the Bosniaks, that he felt 
needed repayment “After the camps, Trenkalòs used to leave the door open to a 
collaboration more focused on a local level, in Barcelona. It wasn't compulsory, but 
the idea was that a maximum of people would be involved[...]It’s a personal 
experience that you could not have anywhere else at home. The impact of living with 
someone that has lived a war is very hard. And one can wonder… is it licit to do a 
service learning round and not continue doing stuff? It doesn’t mean that you are 
forced to do it, but is it licit? There is a need to transcend, either with Trenkalòs or 
with something else… because that’s one of the things that would bother me, if 
people thought that was tourism” (Guixer, 2016). 
 
He also reinforces that the guides were not above the volunteers and that sometimes 
that was a challenge. “Our role was more to accompany them. Sometimes it wasn’t 
about the explanation because they weren’t ready for it. If the volunteers were older 
than you, it was hard to assume a moral authority. We are talking about twenty-year-
old guides. The message sometimes didn’t arrive in everyone” (Guixer, 2016).  
 
He reflects on what surprised him: “The sensation that no one can fix that. To see to 
what extent a conflict that affected a generation, the parents, now is dragging the 
children. They weren’t allowed to choose, and the wounds are open without them 
really understanding why. People born in war, raised in a refugee camp and totally 
unhappy (...) how can a country grow from there?” (Guixer, 2016). 
 
When he goes over Trenkalòs’ activities, he believes that some parts of the 
organization were well done, there was space for improvement “I believe that in the 
schools, one of the things that Trenkalòs did best was presenting a context, and 
accompanying it with personal experiences of the speakers. It was a much easier 
way for students to understand our position than a long and heavy history class” 
(Guixer, 2016). 
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He argues that there was not a specific plan for emotional coping, but that every 
volunteer had the chance to meet with their fellows and talk about. When it comes to 
the success, he is critical “Well, it wasn’t amazing, it has many pros and cons, and 
you realize about the complexity of everything. The project that Trenkalòs brought 
was really interesting, but it had a difficult application. The circumstances change 
everything. There are many beautiful things, but also many negative counterparts”. 
He continues “One of them is that people there expect a continuity that cannot exist. 
In a way, the fact that the work camps happened every year it felt or it could have felt 
that Trenkalòs was a travel agency. And that was very far from what Trenkalòs 
aimed to do. It was really good, especially to help our people know the problem there, 
and for the locals, it was good, too… but everything that wasn’t aimed to train the 
volunteers: the farm, the economic development… that didn’t happen. And to me, 
that was a big problem for the project. I don’t blame them at all, but the impact hasn’t 
been what it should have been[...]The first year the project was done in several 
rounds, with little groups, it was easy to talk to everyone. But in the second round, 
they brought a lot of people all at the same time, and it made things harder for 
everyone to understand what was going on” (Guixer, 2016). 
Short Time Volunteers 
The last section of the narrative analysis concerns the short time volunteers, 
generally young people between sixteen and twenty-five years old. In comparison to 
the organizers and the long time volunteers, they focus on the personal stories that 
shock them, instead of being critical of the situation or the organization.  
 
These interviews have been drawn from Homage to Srebrenica (2007), so there is 
no personal information about each volunteer interviewed. Nonetheless, these are 
invaluable for examining the most immediate and unadulterated impressions in the 
organization. They reflect on their own emotions and often mention the names of the 
refugees whom they lived with, or the closest to their age. “It shocked me to get on 
the bus that would take us to Potočari, there were almost no men, only women, and 
girls. The good mood was surprising[...]At first, I felt ok, but when we entered the 
memorial everything suddenly changed, the cries of women on top of hundreds of 
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tombs[...]like in the pictures you see in the newspapers” (Tona Fernández in 
Trenkalòs,2007:49)0  
 
“We were burying one of Nermin’s uncles. Then I gazed upon this three or four-year-
old kid that was staring at his mother while she fainted. Nermin was on his knees, 
yelling and clawing at the mud while other men put down the coffin in the grave. I 
wondered what that kid was thinking if all that wasn’t condemning the next 
generation forever” (Albert Duarte in Trenkalòs, 2007:117)  
 
“I could not believe that those people of the same age as I had lived there forever[...]I 
would wake up every morning seeing them there, waiting, always with that smile” 
(Laura Vila in Trenkalòs, 2007:101) “It was surprising to see all those grown up men, 
big and strong, that went through all those years fighting in the trenches and that had 
seen everything, in tears at the farewell, only because we stayed some days with 
them. It felt heartwarming (Pol Camps in Trenkalòs, 2007:71). 
 
“I could not stop thinking about everything I had lived[...]I found an interview of a 
refugee, Indira Dautovic, that they did in La Vanguardia. It was like I had never read 
it, like if all that I read in February didn’t affect me one inch, but now it had much 
more sense. And I started crying badly[...]I didn’t cry in Šahbegovići, where everyone 
cried like babies, but I was crying a week later, over a piece of newspaper” (Ignasi 
Masdéu in Trenkalòs, 2007:68)  
 
They use the expressions ‘grandpa’ or ‘grandma’ when referring to old people in the 
camp or in the town, which could be explained as cultural cues or as signs of 
affection. They also refer to the refugees with their first name, with the familiarity one 
would talk to a friend. The first impressions of the Mihatovići camp, the burials in 
Potočari, the town of Šahbegovići, are often a mix of nervousness and excitement: 
“At first, the life in the refugee camp did not feel as harsh as I was told, because the 
family I lived with had several commodities[...]until they started talking about the war, 
about what happened in Srebrenica, and all that these people lived… and then you 
realize that a TV or a stereo don’t mean anything[...]When I think about Srebrenica, it 
comes to my mind the creepy image of the battery factory. It was the ultimate 
demoralization, entering there and walking among the thousands of tombs[...]Some 
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of the young people we were accompanying found out that they had relatives buried 
there. You see them crying like that and you don’t know how to react, or how to 
share their pain (Adrià Sariols in Trenkalòs, 2007:91). “When you go back home, to 
Catalonia there are moments when you need to talk to someone, to explain what 
happened, but you lock yourself in because you know that they will not understand 
(Laura Vila in Trenkalòs, 2007:68). 
My personal experience 
As has been stated above, I have participated in two trips to Bosnia & Herzegovina, 
although they were really different from one another. The first was in 2015, the 20th 
anniversary of Srebrenica. It was a special year since there were no summer camps 
organized, the group was rather little, and there were no activities with the refugees. 
On the contrary, the second round was a fully-fledged service learning summer 
camp, alongside twenty-seven more volunteers and organizers. We stayed at the 
refugees’ homes, ate with them and developed personal relationships. 
 
Thinking about the volunteers, I reflected on my own sensations. A key factor is the 
sensation of time. Especially in a place like Mihatovići, an unfamiliar, and dangerous-
looking location, the sensation of alert was present at all times. Even though 
everyone quickly adapted to the place, we were faced with unusually exhausting 
situations.  
 
Oddly enough, the first one is the hospitality. We were distributed in pairs and sent to 
meet our hosts, accompanied by the chatter in Bosnian/Serbo-Croat. Perhaps it 
might sound like an odd discomfort, but the excessive generosity of the Bosnians is 
hard to fight off. Exorbitant amounts of food accompanied by the effort to understand 
the hosts can be especially tiring. Every meal becomes a challenge. 
 
The second is the people themselves, especially the refugees in Mihatovići. It is 
clear that they pay a toll for the bad conditions they have to live in. Adults either 
strive to be nice, or they do not at all. The social structures I witnessed were mainly 
patriarchal, although it seemed like women were the most successful students. Even 
though the sheer amount of diabetes among the Bosniaks in general, they kept 
eating sweets, cake and soda drinks, and rarely ate vegetables or fruit. Combined 
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with a general like for cigarettes, many people lacked several teeth. Children 
wandered around the camp and fought among each other at the slightest 
provocation. Overall they were very curious and quite carefree. It was common to 
have them join our meetings, although they would not understand anything. 
 
The third hindrance is the activities. When explaining the work we did in the camp, 
people expect some sort of material achievement, but mostly they were focused on 
the refugees. There were talks by war veterans, which details were quite gruesome 
although our translation did her best to soften them; games for the kids, which often 
broke down into fights and we had to intervene; and special events like a fashion 
show or a memorial to the massacre of Srebrenica. Even if the task was little, there 
are few breaks. Some tasks proved to be quite exhausting, like watching over the 
technical equipment, were challenging, as kids would play ball, ride bicycles or try to 
“help” by moving gear around. 
 
These obstacles put the body and mind under stress, quickly diminishing the energy 
and a consistent limitation on mental processing. We were constantly bombarded 
with information, many of which contained traumatic stories of war survivors and 
victims. Even after having had heard most of those stories before, the 
contextualization is very effective.  
 
Many volunteers experienced a connexion with their own personal tragedies, 
especially during the Srebrenica memorial activity in Mihatovići, and the one at the 
actual memorial. To help cope with the accumulated steam, the organizers would 
organize round tables in little groups allowing everyone to express themselves. 
Nonetheless, the overall experience was extremely positive. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
Earlier in this master’s thesis, two research questions were established around a 
case study. The case was presented, as well as a conjunction of data and theory. 
The questions were: How did Trenkalòs evolve from a humanitarian aid NGO to a 
service learning organization? How did the NGO volunteers understand the process 
and the outcome of their activities?  
 
The first question concerned the evolution of the Catalan NGO Trenkalòs through 
their almost twenty years of activity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As stated before, the 
organization was created in 1997 with the initial idea of gathering audiovisual and 
photographic material in the country right after the end of the conflict. This had two 
purposes: To raise awareness of the crude situation of the aftermath, and to offer 
training to students interested in humanitarian aid and international development 
projects.  
 
Therefore, Bosnia was not the initial focus or the only country the NGO visited, but it 
is the place where the organization has invested in most by far. In Catalonia, the 
members realized that schools did not have programs designed to allow children to 
develop aid projects, thus limiting their capacity to empathize with unprivileged 
people in conflict areas.  
 
At the same time, once in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Trenkalòs was able to dynamically 
react to the necessities of the refugees, with whom they interacted directly. It allowed 
the NGO to act as a middle man, transporting materials collected in the schools in 
Catalonia to refugee centers in Bosnia. As an organization with an active profile, 
more volunteers joined, especially scout groups, who already developed their own 
little projects, and were old enough to be able to travel to Bosnia. But the organizers 
saw a couple of issues: scout members were used to be part of the development of 
the projects, as well as having a voice in the decision making of their own 
organizations.  
 
In a post-conflict area, with limited resources and personnel, rash attitudes could 
decide the success or the failure of a project, so the NGO adapted a hierarchical 
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structure, and limited the actions of the volunteers to physical work and learning. 
Trenkalòs would visit Bosnia-Herzegovina in irregular intervals, until in 2005, when 
they had enough contacts on the ground, as well as funding to develop medium 
projects.  
 
At that time, the volunteer pool was big enough that they decided to develop a 
program for volunteers to live with refugees, as active witnesses and able workforce 
to develop more permanent projects. This ‘work camps’ are an example of service 
learning. This shift of activities was also a reaction to a deeper problem in post-war 
Bosnian society: ten years after the war, thousands of refugees were jobless and 
barely surviving in borderline physical and emotional situations.  
 
To try to help, Trenkalòs tackled basic issues rooted in the refugees: creating jobs, 
promoting the return to their previous homes, and providing emotional support in the 
shape of people willing to listen to them, actively acknowledge their existence. This 
allowed the organization to have a stable source of self-funded volunteers, between 
thirty to sixty per year (more, depending on the year). In exchange, the organizers 
offered training in the history of the country, the effects of war, developing 
economies; and would be receiving lessons from war veterans, researchers and 
experts in Bosnia.  
 
The mentality of the organization led by Jordi Rodrigo and Marta Catalan, later 
expanded to Rodrigo’s partners and volunteers; was quite direct. They would expect 
volunteers to act as professionals and maintain a standard of quality. It had a 
company-like structure, success was to be expected, and disrespectful or 
inadequate behaviors were not tolerated. This hierarchical structure allowed Rodrigo 
and the other organizers to focus on their own work, like keeping personal relations 
with the refugees; especially in tense situations like accompanying them to the mass 
burials of the Srebrenica Memorial at the factories of Potočari.  
 
This direct approach was reflected in many of their activities. Liberal state building 
practitioners put their trust in international advisors and urban oligarchs when 
assessing the needs of the locals. Instead, Trenkalòs would travel by road to remote 
villages and communities, and observed what was lacking. That allowed them to 
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discover the realities of the common men: long queues at the borders, destroyed 
bridges, marks of paramilitary groups on burned facades, taking risks in the process. 
 
Nevertheless, they had obstacles: the size of the volunteer pool was challenged by a 
very limited amount of funding. Donated personally and raised at home, the 
quantities would oscillate around thirty thousand Euro per year during the 
establishment of the service learning program, a flimsy amount compared to the 
funding of strong international NGO. 
 
To answer the research question, one of the possible outcomes of putting an NGO 
through the strain of maintaining projects through such a prolonged amount of time is 
the adaptation of a very hierarchical and organized strategy. Since there are very 
few organizations with similar attributes, it is hard to compare or imagine other 
strategies that would have the same impact. 
 
Parting from having very limited income and a bottom-up approach based on 
volunteer work, if there are any mistakes it is very hard to overcome them by pure 
force of money. Therefore, the efforts need to be invested in calculating every detail 
of the mission, so that eventful inconveniences can be marginalized as much as 
possible. 
 
The second question is directly linked to the amount of time the volunteers spend in 
the country, since the more iterations they experience, the more they become 
familiar with the NGO, and have clearer ideas of its purposes and flaws. Organizers 
are well aware of the limitations of the NGO, but also its advantages. They realize 
that it is not possible to help everyone that needs it, and that their effort will not 
ultimately solve all the problems of the refugees, but that it is more of a small 
addition to a higher purpose.  
 
The organizers are well versed in coordinating events, which often includes knowing 
how to minimize the levels of intrusion of the volunteers in the Bosniak traditions, 
while at the same time maximizing the positive outcomes of service learning. They 
often have a resigned attitude, product of facing obstacles all the way from the 
beginning of the planning. They have multiple acquaintances in Bosnia, which allows 
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them to keep track on the situation of the country and develop a personal 
compromise with them. 
 
Both in the interviews and the summer camps, organizers profess a high admiration 
for the Dobro Dosli program, with many times having argued that it has not needed 
any change during the whole extent of its application. Its flaws are often classified as 
marginal, or a product of limited resources. 
 
Long time volunteers or guides are the most critical, since although they have a 
personal compromise with the organization, their ideals do not completely match with 
those of the NGO, or they have not faced too many hardships on the ground. 
Although they comment on the benefits of their involvement, often they lament not 
being able to do more. There is also a difference of age, usually guides are on the 
range of the twenties, while organizers tend to be between their thirties and fifties. 
 
They often show an energetic and optimistic attitude, that turns into frustration when 
it faces impossible challenges. Guides also have a different relationship towards the 
refugees than that of the Organizers’. Personal war stories and feats of survival 
might seem more ordinary to those who have listened to them many times, but for 
guides and short time volunteers, these are some of the most impactful memories of 
their service in the country. 
 
Lastly, short time volunteers focus mainly in their outcomes rather than of those of 
the refugees and the organization. They reflect on personal anecdotes that are 
relatable to them, especially comparing them to their lives back in Catalonia. Many 
have a naïve attitude towards a war and an ethnic cleansing, and some are not able 
to cope with stories of violence and death. They develop bonds with the refugees, 
but often these are superficial, and lose contact after a while. In this group there are 
sometimes volunteers that only contemplate the experience as something of a one-
time adventure, with no deeper meaning to them. 
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A theoretical understanding of Trenkalòs success 
Earlier in this master’s thesis, it was discussed that hybrid peace is located between 
local and international scales, and that finds bridges between these factions and 
their interests to reach agreements which are interesting for both parts. In doing so, 
the actors might resort to actions or individuals that do not actively support 
cooperation, tolerance or understanding, but that are capable of creating a more 
stable situation towards peace (Richmond, 2015:51). 
 
Trenkalòs recognized the inefficiency and arrogance of mainstream peace building, 
and sought to do something without being limited by the system. This was a major 
risk, because not only does international backing provides a series of failsafe 
insurances in case of a crisis, but also can offer actors that easily creates a bridge 
between the NGO and the victims.  
 
Although it might have been more difficult to forge their own contacts, Trenkalòs 
could have avoided some of the negative ideas linked to international organizations. 
such as the failure of the UN, or the perception of aid money being used to buy 
support to international measures rather than as an investment in development. 
They still vouched for human rights, democracy and peace, but implementing those 
things was far out of their reach. Their goal was to help the war victims immediately, 
and that is reflected in their actions. 
 
One of the aspects in Trenkalòs’ ideas which is more reflected in the theory is the 
everyday efforts and commitment to the Bosniak communities. By reaching out, 
keeping communication and contact, especially in critical times like the memorial of 
the Srebrenica massacre, but also in celebrations like Bajram, the organization 
established a connection that would become part of the victims’ lifes. These 
everyday efforts dealt with a need of the population which was to be remembered 
after an atrocious war. Local and everyday practices of peace are staples of 
Trenkalòs, and a key to their success in maintaining their projects and supporting the 
victims of war. 
 
When it comes to service-learning, the effectivity of the Dobro Dosli program is, in 
my opinion, very high. Not only it is an opportunity for students to improve their 
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abilities in relation to their careers, but it can also lead them to different and new 
paths. Dobro Dosli is not an academia-based service-learning program, but offers 
the same benefits. “The opportunity to see and act on the problems individuals and 
communities face, engage in dialogue and problem solving with the people most 
affected, and observe firsthand the effects of racism, sexism, poverty, and 
oppression” (Jacoby, 2014:11).  
 
One of the main differences with an academia-based service-learning and one that it 
is not is the major variety in personalities, ages, economic and cultural backgrounds 
of the participants. The skills applied might not be as polished or developed as 
university students; but innocence, bravery, kindness, open-mindedness, curiosity 
life experience and personal struggles can be found in any participant, and the 
resulting knowledge, experience and investment has the same value as any other. 
 
One of the interesting parts of 2016’s service-learning round of Trenkalòs was the 
stark variety of profiles among the volunteers. For the first time, the age segment 
was stretched to fit people from ages of 16 years old to 55. The experiences, 
interactions and reactions of these people in the same environment were infinitely 
different, but in sharing them, the volunteers were not only learning from their hosts, 
but from their fellows as well. 
 
As stated before, Jacoby (2014) evaluated the different benefits of service-learning, 
and one of them is the reflection of the volunteer’s on their field experiences. During 
the service-learning camps, there are several rounds of self-expression and 
reflection meetings. In these, the organizers try to find out what is the general 
attitude of the group, and make sure that people understand the context in which 
they are living.  
 
After the camps, a common struggle is to find the way back to normality. Volunteers 
face contradictions and inadequacies in the attitudes of their fellows and family, 
especially related to conformism and a lack of interest towards alien conflicts. These 
difficulties are a sign of “flourishing” (Jacoby, 2014:11), an attitudinal shift towards 
victims of conflict. The process that leads back to normality might neutralize this 
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change in a part or in its totality, but to keep an open mind is in the hands of the 
volunteers.  
 
Peace Education is perhaps the less clear of my theoretical approaches, and the 
reason is because Trenkalòs does not use peace education as a means, nor as their 
goal. But I believe that their work is intrinsically related this field. The organization 
uses a direct approach to violence, and the organizers are not afraid to put the 
volunteers psychologically straining situations. Peace Education aims to study 
violence and challenge the actual system, which gravitates around war to explain the 
major historical feats of humanity (Harris, 2004:5). To do so, scholars push for a 
study and a critic of violence at all levels of education, and to offer alternatives to 
violence when facing conflict. 
 
Still, Danesh (2006) argues that current education is structured around conflict, and 
that coexistence and cooperation are not discussed in profundity. Trenkalòs’ 
approach would probably be reflected as belonging to the mainstream style of 
education. The NGO’s prolonged activities in Bosnia have turned their approach to a 
cynical, down-to-earth one. The possibility for cooperation and coexistence is 
considered as an ideal scenario, but their experience has often shown that deep-
rooted conflict of Bosnia & Herzegovina rarely allows for these solutions. 
 
Therefore, peace education is an ideal possibility, but not the more probable or 
suitable one in a post-war or development. This renders this particular theoretical 
approach slightly marginal, but still manages to raise awareness about a conflict that 
would be effectively forgotten outside of the Balkans or the academic world. 
Further applications of this study 
The purpose of this study was to describe the activities of Trenkalòs and its 
volunteers, but also to showcase their method for future references. One of the 
arguments of the organizers is that the Dobro Dosli project is easily replicable in 
Bosnia & Herzegovina, and has considerable outcomes compared to its flaws. It 
does not only offer psychological and monetary support to people in crude life 
situations, but also provides first hand field experience for young students with a 
105 
future in development. It is also remarkably cheap, although it does require a 
monumental personal effort.  
 
The main ingredient is the presence of an actor that is both knowledgeable and 
willing to compromise with a long-term project. It does not need to be a foreign 
person, in fact, it would be ideal that a Bosnian would take the leave and organize a 
project of their own. Restoring houses and painting murals in ethnic cleansed 
villages to promote return, as well as attract young population and tourists with 
outdoor sports, cultural heritage and the possibility of jobs would largely invigorate 
the economy and the future prospects any Bosnian in the area, no matter what 
ethnic group they belonged to. 
 
There are obstacles, of course. There are large minefields which have not been yet 
removed, and landslides and floods have displaced a quantity of them, limiting the 
outdoor aspects of the breathtaking Bosnian scenery. The lack of jobs often draws 
young people to the larger cities, hampering any prospect of repopulating 
abandoned villages in the countryside. And the scars of the war are still present, 
especially in the Republika Srpska, where the Bosniak return is still minimal, and the 
ethnic cleansers pose barriers and threats to returnees still. 
 
Nonetheless, it is possible, since it has been done before: Trenkalòs is proof of it. 
The service learning program could be adapted in any European country, since most 
of the communication is done in English and German. Moreover, a network of new 
communities, especially populated by young people, would reinforce the sense of 
common land, create mixed ethnic bonds, families, businesses, and slowly restore 
what the Bosnian society was after the war: a tolerant society based on a rich 
cultural background. 
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